



JPRS-TAC-93-009
29 April 1993



JPRS Report



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Foreign Minister Qian on Korean Disarmament

*OW2104132893 Beijing XINHUA in English
1314 GMT 21 Apr 93*

[Excerpts] Bangkok, April 21 (XINHUA)—Both China and the Republic of Korea believe that the strengthening of relations between the two countries are in conformity with the interests of the peoples of the two countries and are of great importance to the stability of Northeast Asia.

These remarks were made here this afternoon by Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea Han Sung-chu when the two met to discuss issues of common concern. [passage omitted]

Qian said that China, as always, supports the proposal that the Korean peninsula be free of nuclear weapons of any kind.

On the issue of nuclear inspections, Qian said China is in favour of solving this issue properly through consultations among all parties concerned. [passage omitted]

PRC Envoy to UN Accuses 'Some Nuclear Powers' of Double Standards

*OW2104032493 Beijing XINHUA in English
0247 GMT 21 Apr 93*

[Text] United Nations, April 20 (XINHUA)—Disarmament remains an arduous task and the international community

still has a long way to go, Chen Jian, Chinese deputy permanent representative to the U.N., said today.

Addressing the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the Chinese ambassador said that although the U.S. and Russia ratified START I and signed START II, and the chemical weapons convention has been concluded, some nuclear powers have yet to give up their policy of deterrence and stop the manufacture and development of space weapons aimed at maintaining their strategic superiority.

He pointed out that the nuclear weapons in the Commonwealth of Independent States are arousing more and more concern from all sides.

With regard to the transfer of conventional arms, Chen said some countries do not match their words with their deeds and practice double standards.

He pointed out that they talk about openness, transparency and restriction while blatantly breaking the commitments they have undertaken in international agreements by selling large quantities of sophisticated offensive weapons and equipment.

This, Chen said, grossly interferes in the internal affairs of other countries and adversely affects the balance of power and stability in the regions concerned.

POLAND

ICBM Launchers Discovered at Former Soviet Base in Poland

LD2604220093 Warsaw TVP Second Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 26 Apr 93

[Text] Intercontinental missile launchers, a nuclear weapons store, and two tanks for (?semina), a rocket-fuel, have been discovered by a group of experts from the Military Technical Academy. Containers for the transportation of missiles have also been discovered. Military experts are carefully examining the terrain left behind by the former Soviet Army. Its recultivation will take tens of years and will cost almost 18 trillion zloties.

[Correspondent Katarzyna Andrysiak] The two tanks with (?semina), a rocket-fuel, were discovered at the base in Borne-Sulimowo. There are also around 2,000 containers for fuel and oils in this extensive terrain. Their capacity is between 30,000 and 50,000 liters each. In another part of the forest a store for nuclear weapons has been discovered together with intercontinental missile launchers. At Kluczew the containers used to transport the missiles have also been discovered. [video cuts to show Adam Spychala, head of the Military Technical Academy Coordination Commission, speaking]

[Spychala] At this time one might be tempted to formulate two fundamental conclusions. The first, that on the examined terrain contamination by toxic battlefield

materials and also radioactive contamination have not been confirmed. And second, that the most threatening element degrading the environment here is oil-based products.

[Andrysiak] Examination work is made difficult because the so-called clandestine complexes [kompleksy tajne] had no inventories drawn up when they were handed over. The photography of this terrain does not always allow for the type of contamination to be specified. Unexploded shells are frequently discovered, which apart from the enormous ecological damage, constitute a threat to life.

A cemetery has also been discovered in Borne-Sulimowe where soldiers sentenced by wartime courts [sady wojenne] were buried. The wartime courts with heightened discipline had jurisdiction over the Russian units stationed in Poland. [video shows row of fuel tanks in forest, painted green; close-up of Russian markings: "name of product—samin, quantity tonnes—, delivery date—8.88, date last tested - 12.88"; two more tanks in forest, painted silver; armored entry door to concrete bunker; detail of hinges of bunker door; pile of approximately 60 green-painted missile-transport carrier tubes; derelict storage sheds; scattered and broken missile containers; aerial photograph; man checking content of underground storage bunker through inspection vent; hanger with one door slid open; unexploded shell; panning shot of cemetery beginning to fall into neglect]

GENERAL

CIS Deputy Defense Chief on Joint Command Procedures

PM2604104593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Apr 93 First Edition p 6

[Interview with Colonel General B.Ye. Pyankov, deputy commander in chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces, by Vladimir Tyurkin; place and date not given; under general heading "Will We Be Able To Stand Up for Ourselves?": "Fifth Finger on the 'Button'"]

[Excerpt] Tyurkin: The CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command. Not all Russians have a clear idea of what this is.

Pyankov: It is an organ of management staffed by 300 generals and officers. The officer elite came to us, we had the opportunity to select people, and far from everyone was able to join us. Expressing the will of the heads of states—above all, those with nuclear weapons on their territory—the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces tackles basic questions connected with their use. We have no troops subordinate to us.

Tyurkin: That is, the main area is nuclear.

Pyankov: This is so at present. There are four "nuclear" presidents, and they have to have a corresponding structure—the Joint Armed Forces. Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov, our commander in chief, and the Joint Armed Forces Main Staff participate in drawing up the principles of the use of nuclear weapons and planning, and on behalf of the presidents they control the possibility of a launch. Figuratively speaking, each president must press one-fourth of a common "button." I mean Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.

Tyurkin: But what does this "button" look like? Where do you hide it?

Pyankov: Well, this is a mythical name. The commander in chief has in his office here a communications system which, by issuing certain signals, authorizes the use of the weapons. No launch is possible unless these prearranged signals are given. It is neither a button nor a switch.

Tyurkin: Have I understood you correctly? If three presidents decide in favor, but the fourth against, there will be no launch?

Pyankov: In principle, there will in that case be no use of nuclear weapons. There are corresponding political accords to this effect.

Tyurkin: Where does coordination take place? Who decides if all the votes have been cast?

Pyankov: The commander in chief has a direct, instant link with all the heads of state, and it is his responsibility to ascertain these positions. There can be two situations:

some lengthy conflict, when it is possible to adopt a decision in good time, without hurrying. The other situation is when a decision has to be adopted instantly, if, for example, an enemy missile launch has been detected. But today we proceed from the premise that a potential adversary will not use nuclear weapons. Nor do we intend to use them. So there will be time enough for consultation. [passage omitted]

USA Institute Scholar Ponders Future of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Relationship

PM2604123393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 24 Apr 93 p 5

[Article by Sergey Rogov, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute: "How Can We Go Beyond Mutual Nuclear Deterrence"]

[Text] Even if they lack conflicting interests Russia and the United States still retain a gigantic military, primarily nuclear, potential, the ability to destroy one another within 30 minutes. This confers a special character on their relations distinguishing them from relations with any other powers. In B. Clinton's opinion, eliminating the nuclear threat from the former USSR is a matter of paramount importance: "No other national security problem is more urgent than the question of who controls the former Soviet empire's nuclear weapons and technologies."

Presumably a new kind of Russian-U.S. collaboration in the strategic sphere will be a priority sphere of partnership between the former rivals. Their strategic forces are continuing their confrontation today within the framework of the mutual nuclear deterrence inherited from the "cold war." Moreover, the reserve of strategic stability, particularly in a crisis, is extremely low since both sides, fearing a disabling, preemptive attack, are keeping their missiles in a state of permanent readiness for a retaliatory or counter attack.

Russia and the United States can hardly go rapidly beyond the framework of the mutual nuclear deterrence scenario. However, over the next few years they can considerably strengthen strategic stability by abandoning the concept of a retaliatory or counter attack and switching to the kind of configuration and composition of nuclear forces that would enable them to rely totally on the concept of a guaranteed retaliatory strike.

Implementing the START I Treaty alone, a treaty which only envisages quantitative cuts but does not qualitatively change the nature of the strategic confrontation, is not enough to ensure this. What is needed is the ratification of the START II Treaty, which Clinton's predecessor signed just two weeks before the change of White House incumbent. That will make it possible to preserve Russian-U.S. nuclear parity, reduce the level of nuclear confrontation, and not only quantitatively reduce the sides' nuclear forces, but also

eliminate the most destabilizing arms systems that possess counterforce capabilities.

Russia's agreeing to destroy its ground-launched MIRVed ICBMs undoubtedly drastically reduces the threat to U.S. national security. In turn, the Americans have pledged to reduce the number of warheads on their submarine-launched ballistic missiles, thus radically reducing the threat of a preemptive counterforce strike for the Russian side.

Is this adequate compensation for the concession made by Russia, which will now have to totally reorganize its strategic triad. The abandonment of the overwhelming majority of ground-launched missiles and reliance on the naval and aviation component of the strategic forces will necessitate considerable expenditure by Russia. Citing this along with the vulnerability of Russia's strategic submarines to U.S. ASW systems and the weakness of Russia's long-range aviation, conservative circles in Russia are trying to block the START II Treaty, which has, regrettably, fallen hostage to the domestic political struggle.

However, our enemies of the START II Treaty refuse to consider that, without that treaty, missiles on Ukrainian territory will not be destroyed, that republic being clearly reluctant to honor its pledge to subscribe to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nuclear-free state. What is more, if ratification of the START II Treaty is wrecked, the START I Treaty will hardly be implemented either, thus giving Ukraine an opportunity to own nuclear missiles. This will undoubtedly boost the nuclear ambitions of states like India, Pakistan, and Iran, not to mention North Korea and Iraq. How will Germany and Japan react to the breakdown of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the expansion of the "nuclear club"?

Clearly, Russia and the United States have an interest in preserving the nonproliferation regime. The new administration has indicated that it intends to act more resolutely to prevent Ukraine's attempts to "nationalize" the nuclear weapons on its territory. Ukraine will hardly honor its commitment to subscribe to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty without pressure from Clinton. At the same time the Americans may agree to a number of measures that will make it possible to limit their advantages in the strategic forces at sea and reduce the threat to our submarines. Cooperation in mutually reducing the level of the strategic forces' combat readiness and the implementation of coordinated measures to qualitatively rather than quantitatively reinforce strategic stability are also extremely possible. Such steps may in particular envisage central storage of heavy bombers' nuclear arms, changing the nose sections of missiles on which the number of warheads is being reduced (for instance, the D-5 missiles of Trident-2 submarines that are being "downloaded" from eight to four warheads each) in order to ensure that it is technically impossible to fit them with additional warheads, limiting combat patrol areas and the number of strategic submarines on

combat patrol, and restricting the activity of ASW systems near the permanent bases of the other side's strategic submarines. What is more, the sides could agree to cooperate in early warning and create a number of systems for shared use, including in space. That would help avoid dangerous technical mistakes, particularly in conditions when Russia has destroyed the Krasnoyarsk radar, while radars in the other former Soviet republics have become their property.

Evidently, extensive U.S.-Russian cooperation in supervising sales of conventional arms and military technology is also quite feasible. That is the second sphere in which the two powers will evidently engage in active cooperation under Clinton. That kind of cooperation will obviously be needed on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis. Otherwise, an uncontrolled arms trade may drastically destabilize the situation in highly explosive areas, including the Near and Far East. At the same time the United States must take Russia's legitimate interests into consideration and agree to talks on trade in arms and military technology, including allocating Russia a quota on the world market.

Finally, Russia and the United States must cooperate in creating new regional and global mechanisms to ensure international security. It is necessary to realize the potential of the United Nations, which was set up as an instrument for maintaining security in a multipolar world. The bipolar system of international relations that emerged as a result of the Soviet-U.S. conflict paralyzed the United Nations, whereas it can now fulfill its role. The prospects for Russian-U.S. cooperation in keeping international peace under UN auspices are extremely favorable now. Thus, a move to strategic partnership not only will be in the interests of our two states, but also will help strengthen international peace and security.

(Footnote) (Professor Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov is deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute and a doctor of historical sciences. He has written 10 books and around 300 scientific articles on problems pertaining to the United States and Canada and Soviet-U.S. and Russian-U.S. relations).

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Norwegian Minister Calls on Russia To Ratify START II

LD2204180793 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1658 GMT 22 Apr 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Smelyakov]

[Text] Moscow April 22 TASS—Visiting Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst called on Russia to ratify the START-2 Treaty which Norway considers to be "an acceptable and stabilising factor".

Holst said at a meeting at the Russian Diplomatic Academy on Thursday that in order to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and put an end to arms race Norway was calling upon states possessing nuclear weapons to sign a treaty completely banning nuclear tests. Norway is a party concerned because it is situated in close proximity to Russia's nuclear test range at Novaya Zemlya.

Holst noted that Norway was making its own contribution to the creation of a new order in Europe in matters of security, which is based on partnership and cooperation. "We support the Vance-Owen plan for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Yugoslavia," he said.

On the same day the Norwegian foreign minister left for home.

Belarus: Kravchenko, Christopher Discuss Nuclear Policy, Aid

*LD2004103893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1221 GMT 20 Apr 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Korolev]

[Text] Washington April 20 TASS—The purpose of the official visit of Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko to the United States, which began here on Monday, is to promote and strengthen bilateral relations between the United States and Belarus. His agenda includes meetings with some high-ranking representatives of the Clinton administration to discuss a wide range of bilateral problems, including the fulfilment of start agreements and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as problems of American-Belarusian economic relations.

The foreign minister had talks with his American counterpart Warren Christopher. This was the first top-level contact between the Belarusian government and the new U.S. Administration.

Christopher has assessed highly the Belarusian stand on nuclear weapons, its consistent steps to get rid of nuclear stockpiles and to become a nuclear-free state. He said that the United States had adopted a decision to allocate 65 million U.S. dollars to help dismantle the nuclear weapons that are still deployed on Belarusian territory. He said there were also several other concrete economic aid packages for Belarus, which Washington planned to implement. However, the extent of such aid would depend on the continuation of economic reforms in the republic.

Kravchenko said that both sides were interested in giving a fresh impulse "to cooperation and to the assistance needed to implement an indepth economic reform". Mentioned as possible areas were programmes to establish control over the export of uranium and other radioactive materials, to retrain servicemen and build housing for them, to restore the environment, and to

switch over the military industry to peaceful rails. Corresponding Belarusian proposals were handed over to the U.S. secretary of state.

The sides also discussed the possibility of granting broader aid to Belarusian economy, especially its key sectors, and touched on the need to distribute U.S. aid proportionally among the states - successors of the former USSR.

Russian Official on UNITA Action, Ukrainian START Stance

*LD2704125493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1142 GMT 27 Apr 93*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Sergey Staroselsky]

[Excerpt] Moscow, April 27 (TASS)—"The Russian Foreign Ministry strongly protests against a bandit action, committed by the UNITA in Angola," head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Directorate Sergey Yastrzhembsky told a briefing here today in connection with an incident that had occurred in Angola on April 26, when an AN-12 plane with a Russian crew on board was damaged by a UNITA missile. [passage omitted]

"Russia is surprised by the statement made by Ukrainian Minister for the Protection of the Environment Yuriy Kostenko during a recent press conference, devoted to the Ukrainian parliament's preparations to ratify the START-1 treaty, claiming that Ukraine is a nuclear power," Yastrzhembsky stated.

He noted that Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukrainian president, bluntly stated the other day that Ukraine was not a nuclear power. "This situation cannot be described otherwise than Ukraine's 'nuclear drift', as we have earlier assessed it," he added.

"Having signed the Lisbon Protocol," Yastrzhembsky recalled, "Ukraine had voluntarily assumed a commitment to join the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty as a nuclear-free state. All the rights and obligations, linked with the possession of the former USSR's nuclear weapons, have been relegated only to Russia."

Mr. Kostenko has also claimed that Russia had allegedly threatened to discontinue nuclear fuel deliveries to Ukrainian atomic power plants. "This statement is a complete fabrication," the Russian diplomat stated. "Russia, as always, expects Ukraine to scrupulously fulfil international agreements and has repeatedly declared its readiness to help Ukraine implement the commitments it had assumed in respect to nuclear weapons," Yastrzhembsky stressed. "The statement made by a minister, who heads the Ukrainian delegation to the talks on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory, merely complicates the situation and the Russian side cannot be indifferent to it," he added.

Russian 'Expert' Argues Against Accepting START II

PM2104105793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 April 93 p 3

[Petr Belov article: "Disarmament, But Intelligently. National Security and the START II Treaty. Seven Points by an Independent Expert"]

[Text] It is recent articles in "independent" and "democratic" newspapers timed to coincide with the parliamentary hearings on the START II Treaty which prompted these reflections. I will only comment briefly on the basic points made by an article in IZVESTIYA of 10 April this year.

The need to publicize alternative assessments of START II is clear in view of the effective thwarting of four open parliamentary hearings already and the desire to surround them with a secrecy which is completely unjustified and actually criminal in intent.

1. How the Treaty Came Into Being

May I be so bold as to assert that START II was not 6 months in preparation and not 10 pages long. Maybe we worked on it for 6 months and, apart from the 10 pages of text forced on us, have no calculations, justifications, and proof of its acceptability.

The United States had been moving toward the START II Treaty for 10 years. As far back as the late 1970's the senselessness of continuing to build up nuclear potential was demonstrated at the U.S. Defense Studies Institute (Arlington, Virginia).

However, while carrying out limitation and reductions, the United States did not abandon hopes of world domination and put forward roundabout ideas for achieving this via SDI. The senselessness of this venture too was confirmed in the late 1980's at the SDI Center for Computer Modeling and Simulation Programs (at the Falconer Air Force Base). Here the expediency of transforming SDI into a global shield—but against a limited missile strike—was proven. Calculations were provided complying with this indicator for limits on our strategic offensive weapons. These ideas were enshrined in the "framework agreements" of 17 June 1992.

Thus the drama of START II's history lies in the fact that first everything was taken away from us by these "frameworks," then some things were partly returned, but not everything that was owing to us.

2. Who Made Concessions and What They Cost

Analysis of the U.S. concessions which, it is claimed, facilitated the reaching of START II leads to the conclusion that there are in fact no such concessions. Supposedly the most significant concessions are the giving up of around 50 of the latest "Peacekeepers" and the reduction in the number of nuclear warheads on "Minutemen" and "Tridents." The true reason for this decision is that the

United States is carrying out a program to gradually switch from a strategic triad to a system based on two types of weapons by getting rid of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, finding them to be surplus to requirement when it has such powerful sea-based and air-launched devices. In fact even a smaller number of "low-precision" warheads on sea-launched missiles is quite capable of accounting for our mobile SS-25s: A single submarine can more than "cover" any area where they are deployed. They will have 18 such submarines, and we will have no more than 10 deployment areas.

There should be no talk of concessions with regard to recalculating the number of warheads on heavy bombers: This is merely a restoration of justice. But it was a concession on our part to grant the United States the right to withdraw and, if necessary, also return 95 B-1B bombers to its nuclear forces. This is of interest to the United States in that it allows flexible use of these aircraft with cruise missiles in local conflicts.

Our greatest concession is the consent to abandon silo-launched multiple-warhead missiles. The fact that we had such missiles sunk the idea of global SDI. After all, it is virtually impossible to destroy them using conventional weapons in the nonnuclear phase of a war. Even after a nuclear attack 5 percent of them may survive. And that 5 percent is enough for retaliation against an aggressor, since he will be unable to intercept them via SDI.

The agreement to give up silo-launched multiple-warhead missiles is doubly destructive. It not only deprives us of our only formidable weapon but will ruin us because of the need to rearm with single-warhead mobile and stationary missiles. But using mobile missiles is dozens of times more expensive than using silo-based missiles—both from the viewpoint of the number of personnel required and the speed with which the equipment wears out, and in terms of the ruinous effect on the national economy, especially in the event of accidents. And they are less effective in combat than silo-based missiles.

3. Continuity Which START II's Supporters Fail To Mention

START I, which was ratified in November of last year, was only a stage in the program elaborated by the United States to ensure its own security. Its importance was that it deprived us of half our SS-18 heavy missiles and introduced exceptionally harsh and effectively one-sided limitations on the combat use of mobile missiles. The latter related to carrying out alert duty with these missiles not by means of continual covert patrolling of the whole of Russia's vast territory, as START II's supporters hint, but in a few regions with an area of up to 125,000 square km, and not with all the missiles at one time, but only with 15-20 percent of the number of launchers. The fact that the location of the remaining 80 percent of mobile missiles and of the no more than two

routes for their departure from their permanent base is known makes them easy prey to saboteurs and precision conventional weapons.

Another fact that is not being mentioned is that as "payment" for our retention of 154 SS-18 heavy missiles under START I and 65 under START II (first stage), the United States retained for itself almost two and a half times more heavy bombers and twice as many warheads on submarines. And now, forcing us to eliminate these missiles completely, it only has parity in sea-based warheads and at the same time has retained almost all its bombers, except those which are out of date. This is the continuity which the START-II authors hushed up. Instead of this they agreed to shift the emphasis to submarines, heavy bombers, and mobile missiles, having in advance lost the production base for them, lost the best aircraft with the USSR's collapse, and ceased to develop new models and modernize and produce existing ones.

4. So Is It Worth Sacrificing Heavy Missiles?

The United States and its supporters cited all sorts of arguments against them: They carry 10 warheads but can be destroyed by one or two or "simply by a direct hit," they are very vulnerable in the first stage of their flight—they gather speed for 10 minutes or so before the warheads separate—they are supposedly already very old, and can only be manufactured and modernized in Ukraine and nowhere else, and so on, and so forth. Mobile SS-25s are so much better: invulnerable, general-purpose... So there is no question here—we will give up the SS-18s and leave only SS-25s in their place.

It is not hard to show the invalidity of all the arguments against our retention of silo-launched multiple-warhead missiles, including heavy missiles. They are highly hardened and are almost instantly ready for battle, are stationed in unpopulated, well guarded territory mostly a long way away from borders (practically in the center of Russia) in extremely strong silos withstanding up to 100 atmospheres, and have multiple reserve channels of combat control. And this means that they are out of saboteurs' "reach," that up to 15 conventional cruise missiles—instead of one—are required to destroy them, and, most importantly, they provide a gain by increasing cruise missiles' flight time to three hours, and that of ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles to 10 minutes. For purposes of comparison, the SS-25 is 1,000 times less well hardened and dozens of times less combat-ready when on the move.

And how honest is it to allude to the Ukrainian science and production base which is necessary for the production and modernization of the SS-18s while at the same time not mentioning the fact that we will not be able to do the same for the SS-25s transporter chassis without Belarus. Is it right to disparage the role of Russian scientists and production workers in a such a shameless manner? When they have the design and production and technological documentation not only of the SS-18 but

also of new sophisticated projects. Surely the "Yuzhnoye" design bureau can hand over to us its unwanted projects and technological equipment, thus not losing the nuclear-free status which it has not yet acquired? Or are we more afraid of technological dependence on Ukraine, than Britain is when it buys "Trident" missiles from the United States?

Finally, on the subject of our SS-18s' "decrepit condition." The opinion is being intensively fostered that very nearly all of these missiles were built simultaneously, in the space of one year. In fact, the process of producing them and putting them on alert duty status goes on continuously for five to seven years, and as each series is completed, either modernization of it begins immediately, or renewal through the replacement of missiles whose warranty lifetime has expired. This is how things stand with the SS-18 heavy missiles: A fourth of them are brand new, fourth-version missiles. Another fourth will last another 10 years. Taken together, these are the 154 missiles which START-I allowed us.

5. What Disarmament and Rearmament Will Cost Us

This aspect of START-II is the most poorly calculated and contentious. Here it is a question not so much of the economic but of the ecological costs—which are inter-linked. Professionals know that it is considerably more costly to get rid of nuclear and chemical weapons and their delivery systems in an ecologically sound manner than it is to create them. And attempts to economize and speed up the process of the gradual elimination of strategic offensive weapons will cost our countries considerably more, probably in the shape of an ecological disaster.

We are being fooled by the mention of 70-80 billion when we should be talking about tens of trillions. The Navy alone requires 2 trillion for the decade to disarm.

We will not be saved by the apparent savings by reequipping 90 SS-18 silos; "unscrewing" five out of six warheads from 105 "saved" SS-19s; and using SS-25's equipment from the vacated positions of silo-launched SS-17s and SS-18s. Reequipping a silo for a missile with almost 10 times less capacity is just as expensive as creating a new one. Also, reequipping the comparatively powerful SS-19 missiles, which are capable of carrying more than four tonnes of warheads, to carry a single 300 kg warhead, will hardly boil down to the removal of the five "unnecessary" warheads. In consequence, this will require complete replacement of the entire "payload" and substantial additional work to the guidance system...

6. Is There an Alternative to Ratifying START II

It is likely that the present version of START II will hardly suit the United States and its allies, primarily because of its unpredictable consequences—instability, the possibility that warheads may get into the hands of extremists, and the pollution of wide areas. And likewise they will hardly increase the number of their warheads

and delivery systems if we refuse to ratify it, as the "major specialists" threaten.

On the contrary, such a decision by our Supreme Soviet would raise Russia's status as a genuinely sovereign state. By rejecting START II while simultaneously acknowledging the stipulated or even smaller quantities of warheads, whose delivery systems would be determined in the light of our own interests, we would prove to the world community that we have finally decided on our own idea of national security and can pursue an autonomous military-technical policy.

If the conditions in question are observed, there is no need to fear economic and other punitive sanctions and charges that we are slipping back to "cold war" times. It is obvious that our previous tasks and foreign policy aims are not within our powers. If we really do have amicable partners, they can show their sincerity by establishing mutually advantageous, good-neighborly relations. Their well-being is impossible without Russia's well-being: We are all in the "same boat."

7. Discouraging Assessments of START II and Forecasts

There is no doubt that START II and its authors will go down in history as an example of absolute disregard for Russia's interests. It is impossible to agree with the Foreign Ministry leaders that the treaty rids the world of the arms race and takes our country's economic interests into account. It may plunge us into two races simultaneously—the race to disarm and the race to rearm.

The treaty in question will not ensure a stable, nonviolent world order either. Having lost balancing factors, the United States may not resist the temptation of becoming a "world policeman," which will hardly suit Japan and Western Europe.

In conclusion it should be recognized that both the authors and the supporters of START II do not believe that it is acceptable to Russia or that there is no alternative. How else can you interpret their hasty new initiatives: Without ratifying either START I or START II, they are proposing to renounce ICBMs altogether and to concentrate all submarines in the Northern Fleet alone? Are they concerned about how to save the United States another \$100 billion? Or about how to make our disarmament absolutely irreversible?

Is it not time that we sat all the experts on the START II Treaty with their different views around a single table and presented their arguments to the public for their appraisal? Let them express their viewpoints to the people without reference to authority and secrecy.

Russian 'Specialists' Discuss START II Provisions, Likely Impact

*PM2004120193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 93 First Edition p 15*

[Military observer Colonel Viktor Litovkin account of conversation with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov; Colonel Vladimir Dvorkin, chief of the Russian Ministry of Defense Central Scientific Research Institute; and Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts, under the "Military Review" rubric; place and date of conversation not given: "START II Strengthens Russia's Security, the Fatherland's Major Specialists Believe"]

[Text] Parliament has begun its hearings on the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II), signed in Sochi by the U.S. and Russian Presidents 3 January 1993. The hearings are organized by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committees for Defense and Security Questions, International Affairs, and Foreign Economic Relations. IZVESTIYA will cover in detail the course of discussion of this document, although most of the sessions will now be held behind closed doors.

IZVESTIYA's military observer Colonel Viktor Litovkin; Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov; Colonel Vladimir Dvorkin, chief of the Russian Ministry of Defense Central Scientific Research Institute; and Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts, discuss how the treaty was prepared, its main provisions, the reasons that prompted the Russian leadership to agree to sign it, and the effect of START II on the strengthening of our country's nuclear security.

Who Conducted the Talks and How

The preparation of the START II treaty, my interlocutors told me, has many peculiar features. Earlier the two countries' delegations assembled in Geneva and, round by round, conducted endless negotiations, sent proposals to their capitals, received back instructions, and again held sessions until accord was achieved.

Only then did the heads of state sign the treaty. This is what happened with START I, which was almost 10 years in preparation, and comprised 500 pages of a complex text, not comprehensible to everybody.

The START II treaty took 6 months to prepare and comprises only 10 pages.

The main decisions on it were made at the historic summit of 17 June 1992, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President George Bush met for the first time in Washington, and later at meetings between Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and U.S. Secretaries of State J. Baker and, later, Lawrence Eagleburger.

These meetings were held in London, Geneva, New York, Moscow, and Washington. They were preceded by sessions of experts from each side in their own countries.

The sides twice exchanged their fundamental proposals. The first to do so were Americans in July 1992. Then, after a very long and thorough study of their draft, we did the same. This occurred in late October.

It was only in mid-December, after clarification of certain details and the adoption of a political decision on the preparation of a final version of the START II treaty, that the sides met in Geneva to prepare the full text of the agreement.

As Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov, leader of the Russian delegation, said, the experts worked virtually around the clock, with no breaks even for the Christmas holidays or for the New Year festivities; but late on the evening of 1 January 1993 the text of the treaty was initialed, in other words, signed by the leaders of the groups of experts. On the American side it was signed by Deputy Secretary of State Frank Wisner.

The two delegations at the concluding phase of the negotiations comprised a total of 16 persons from Russia and 24 representatives from the United States (Russian experts joke: The Americans are richer—they were able to bring more people).

Specifically, in addition to its head, the Russian delegation comprised (incidentally, this is the first time this list has been published): Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and Ministry of Foreign Affairs staffers Boris Kvok, Yuriy Klyukin, Oleg Shagov, Mikhail Lebedev, Sergey Zamyatin, and Mikhail Lysenko. The Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Navy were represented by Major General Anatoliy Svetikov; Colonels Anatoliy Lukyanov, Mikhail Polyakov, Valeriy Zarezin, and Boris Artemyev; Captain First Rank Georgiy Morozov; Captain Second Rank Aleksandr Dulenko; and an interpreter, Nikolay Razgonov.

The U.S. delegation comprised, in addition to [Frank] Wisner, Stephen Hadley, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy; Department of Defense representatives Richard Davison and Lieutenant Colonels Kurt Siemon and Bob Boudreau; Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, Colonel Rick Wallace, and Lieutenant Colonel J. Engelbrecht from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Brigadier General John Gordon and Richard Davis from the National Security Council; Dr. Victor Alessi from the Department of Energy; Douglas MacEachin and Steven Wollenhorst from the CIA; Ambassador Linton F. Brooks and Paul Lembesis [transliteration] from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and a further eight persons, including two interpreters.

What were the fundamental differences between the two draft agreements?

The Americans insisted on the complete destruction of all Russian land-based MIRV'ed missiles—including the heavy SS-19 and SS-24 missiles whether installed at fixed sites or mounted on railroad flatcars—with a launch weight of 105 tonnes and a throw weight of four

tonnes, and the heavy SS-18 missiles with a launch weight of 211 tonnes and a throw weight of eight tonnes. At the same time all launch silos for these missiles would be eliminated.

We sought the retention of 154 heavy missile silos, a reduction in the number of warheads on all SS-19 missiles, and a realistic counting of warheads on heavy bombers. In addition, we insisted on the reduction of SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], the main component of U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Agreement was reached relatively quickly on the number of warheads—3,000-3,800.

But the other problems involved long and, at times it seemed, hopeless arguments. Nonetheless, both the Americans and we had to reach agreement.

Both Sides Made Concessions

To simplify the situation, my interlocutors said, it should be understood that the Americans wanted to conclude a treaty before the end of President Bush's term. He had lost the elections to his rival, and he badly needed, by way of compensation and a victorious finale to his rule, to make a major contribution to world history—a breakthrough in strategic arms reductions and the elimination of Russia's heavy missiles, something sought unsuccessfully by his predecessor Ronald Reagan.

We also needed such a treaty, the experts claim. For many reasons. One was that the Clinton administration, bound as it was by the need to resolve domestic problems, would not be quick to take up the disarmament process. Quite a long time would pass before we looked at one another and understood the limits of either side's possibilities, and such delay would present us with very serious economic and technical problems. Their urgency did not allow us to postpone the fate of strategic arms for months on end.

Compromises were inevitable. But they had to reflect the balance of the interests of both sides, my interlocutors said. Both delegations made concessions. Their starting point was the START I Treaty.

What concessions did we make? Just one, but a very big one.

We agreed to eliminate by the year 2003 all land-based MIRV'ed missiles, including heavy missiles. They account for 30 percent of our total number of missiles.

At the same time all U.S. MIRV'ed missiles are to be eliminated or converted. These are the 50 most powerful and most accurate missiles, the MX ("Peacekeeper") with 500 warheads. The number of warheads on the 500 "Minuteman-3" ICBMs will be reduced from 1,500 to 500, in other words from three to one per missile. It will be possible to use 90 of our MIRV'ed missile silos for the single-warhead SS-12M "Topol" missile. The silos will be converted for this purpose. Concrete will be poured in

them to a depth of 5 meters so that they cannot accommodate heavy missiles. The remaining 64 silos will be eliminated. [passage omitted]

In addition, we can convert the nose cones of some missiles by remodeling their platforms into single-warhead missiles, while the surplus missiles are eliminated not by exploding them, but by using them to launch commercial or scientific payloads in space.

The Americans made two concessions. Smaller than ours, but extremely important for us.

They agreed to limit the number of warheads on submarine-launched missiles to 1,750 units, in effect reducing the basic link in their "triad"—which accounts for 55 percent of all weapons [boyezaryad]—to one-third of the existing quantity and one-half of the level stipulated by the START I Treaty.

The second concession concerned nuclear weapons on heavy bombers. When concluding the START I Treaty, we agreed to count 10 weapons per aircraft, but in reality each could carry 20 long-range and shorter-range cruise missiles and up to 12 high precision nuclear aviation bombs. In effect this approach reduced the real potential of U.S. strategic bombers by 4,000 weapons.

Now we have agreed that the number of nuclear weapons on aircraft will be calculated according to their actual armament. And this requires the number of U.S. bombers to be reduced to 100 units.

The New Agreement Builds on the Old

Without the START II Treaty, which has already been ratified by the parliaments of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and is being considered by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the START II Treaty would have been impossible, my interlocutors maintained.

Let us recall that, in the seven years following the ratification of the START I Treaty and the exchange of ratification deeds, both sides were supposed to reduce their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers to the level of 1,600 units, and the weapons on them to 6,000.

But at the time of the conclusion of the START I Treaty the USSR had 2,500 delivery systems and 10,271 weapons while the United States had 2,222 delivery systems and 10,371 nuclear warheads [yadernaya boyegolovka]. At the same time the total throw weight of each side's deployed ICBMs and SLBMs was being reduced by 50 percent as a result of reductions. The modernization of heavy ICBM's was allowed, but the creation [sozdaniye], production, and deployment of new types were banned.

START I provided for notification procedures as regards the creation and flight testing of new types of missiles and for regulations for the monitoring of tests—the exchange of telemetric information and reference data on the specification of missiles. But the main point, the experts stress, is that the whole package of documents

constituted a normative, legal, technical, and limiting basis, on which alone subsequent agreements between our countries could be based.

True, the START I Treaty was based on the fact of the existence of the Soviet Union and its scientific, technical, and industrial potential. On the fact of very close production sharing arrangements with Ukraine, which has a most powerful production and experimental design base with its unique testing units, calibrating instruments, and devices for the full-scale testing and perfection of missiles undergoing modernization.

By the time the START I Treaty was concluded, it was already known, my interlocutors said, that up to 60 percent of combat systems in the rocket troops would have exhausted their guaranteed life spans by 1995, and many others systems would exhaust not only these, but also their extended operational lives as well. It was planned to begin replacing them with modernized missiles in 1997 in order to maintain the quota and the level of 5,000 weapons.

The program for the development [razvitiye] of missiles weapons envisaged: Modernization of the SS-18 heavy liquid-propellant MIRV'ed missile, which was already undergoing experimental design work; improvement of the combat rail-launched missile complex and the fixed-site complex with their SS-24 missiles, which were also MIRV'ed; and finally, experimental design work on the modernization of the single-warhead SS-25 missile "Topol."

Following the collapse of the Union, all work on the SS-18 and SS-24 heavy missiles ceased of its own accord. There were several causes. One was that the umbrella and general designer of these missiles was the "Yuzhnoye" Design Bureau in Dnepropetrovsk. Ukraine assumed nuclear-free status, which presupposes the inadmissibility of the production of strategic offensive arms, which ICBMs are deemed to be according to international norms.

Another cause was the drastic restriction on appropriations for the modernization of these missiles. Russia lacked the funds to finance the work of the Dnepropetrovsk scientists, and Ukraine itself also lacked the funds to keep the work going.

The missile developers [raketchiki] had to choose: Either to create in Russia their own production-sharing arrangements for experimental design work and for a production base for the series production of heavy missiles and of rail-launched and fixed-site missiles, or to create their own standardized MIRV'ed missile, suitable for all launch modes.

But the situation developed in such a way that there were sufficient funds only to modernize the single-warhead missile. And even for this it is necessary to set up production-sharing arrangements on a Russia-wide basis, since Ukraine again accounts for 30 percent of the work.

My interlocutors claimed that, whether we liked it or not, whether we signed the START II Treaty or not, by 2000-2003 Russia would have encountered a situation whereby, carrying out with great difficulty experimental design work only on the single-warhead missile, it would barely reach the level of 3,000 nuclear weapons for all its strategic forces.

MIRV'ed ICBMs will in any case be removed from operation as a consequence of the end of their guaranteed service lives. There can be no question of extending them, since responsibility for this should devolve upon the designer—the "Yuzhnoye" Design Bureau. And this channel has now been cut off.

If there had been no START II Treaty, the experts said, the costs of dismantling these missiles and disassembling and recycling 7,000-8,000 nuclear weapons and 100,000 tonnes of heptyl, the liquid rocket fuel—a highly explosive and toxic substance for the conversion of which no industrial method yet exists—would have been borne by Russia alone.

With the START II Treaty we have chances for international cooperation in this sphere.

Why We Are Sacrificing Heavy Missiles

But the disintegration of the Union and the drastic reductions in appropriations for the modernization of missile weapons are by no means the main reasons for Russia's signing the START II Treaty.

The point is that the development of military science and the research by Russian and U.S. scientists have shown that, however strategic nuclear forces are improved, however the qualitative potential of strike systems is increased, the other side cannot be deprived of the capability of an effective retaliatory strike. That is to say, in all cases the adversary will have the ability to inflict "unacceptable" damage on the attacker. Therefore keeping the existing nuclear potential or increasing it is both monstrously expensive and, more importantly, pointless.

Research proving this was carried out on the basis of simulated strategic operations taking account of the structure, the actual combat strength, the tactical and technical specifications and deployment of both sides' nuclear forces, the strength and specifications of their space-based reconnaissance means and information systems, their missile-attack early-warning systems, their combat command and control and communications systems, and so forth.

An analysis of the results shows that the direction and trend of the development of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces—both the deterrent potential (the effectiveness of retaliatory actions) and the counterforce potential (the ability to hit strategic nuclear forces targets in preemptive actions) are in effect leveling out as their weapons are reduced.

For example, under the START I Treaty the number of weapons is reduced significantly more radically than the number of missiles (the reduction is from 10,271 to 4,271 for the weapons, but only from 2,500 to 1,600 for delivery systems), which drastically increases the stability of the strategic nuclear forces group. If it is assumed, the experts explained, that there are 1,000 warheads per 100 fixed-site missiles, just 100 high precision direct hits are required to destroy them. But if these 1,000 weapons are located on the same number of delivery systems and deployed across Russia's territory—the survivability of these forces will be 10 times greater. The START II Treaty provides for just such a possibility.

But, I commented, many specialists point to possible destabilizing factors which could upset the strategic equilibrium. They include breakthroughs in the military-technical spheres of science capable of drastically reducing the survivability of the strategic forces' combat and backup facilities; the deployment of ABM systems; the disablement of strategic nuclear forces facilities by conventional weapons; and the formation of coalitions of nuclear states. "All this is correct," Col. Dvorkin commented. "Until recently such factors were considered an unsolvable problem in connection with the deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces. But in recent times political and operational-tactical trends have taken shape which enable us to hope for a successful solution of these questions."

First, the sides have reaffirmed their commitment to the 1972 ABM Treaty, while the SDI program is being radically transformed in the direction of land-based tactical ABM systems. Second, there is agreement on both sides on the need to rule out the threat of strategic nuclear forces facilities being hit by conventional weapons in the event of the outbreak of military conflicts, and, third, the plans of Britain and France to develop their nuclear weapons are, according to available information, also being significantly reviewed in view of the new military-political situation.

But, most important of all, a whole series of unilateral steps by the United States—primarily ceasing production of reentry vehicles [boyevyye bloki] carrying W-88 warheads for the ballistic missiles of Trident-2 submarines, eliminating within the START II Treaty framework 1,500 of the weapons on MX missiles, the United States' most accurate ICBMs, and restricting SLBM weapons to 1,750—all this has reduced the United States' total counterforce potential of ICBMs and SLBMs four- or fivefold in comparison with what it was under the START I Treaty.

This is the decisive reason for the fact that, despite the reduction of strategic offensive arms to 3,000-3,500 weapons and the elimination of MIRV'ed ICBMs, the deterrent potential of the Russian Strategic Rocket Troops is increased by more than 50 percent, and that of Russia's strategic nuclear forces as a whole by 25-30 percent.

This is just one reason, the experts said, but it is perfectly sufficient for us to consider the terms of the START II Treaty perfectly acceptable.

At the same time, they said, there was no pressing need for us to continue insisting on our entitlement to the 154 heavy SS-18 missiles, which the Americans described as the most dangerous destabilizing factor for them.

How Much Missile Disarmament Costs

In evaluating the economic consequences of START II, my interlocutors said, it is necessary to allow for the following factors: Direct expenditure on the elimination of arms and military equipment in implementing the START I and START II Treaties; the costs of developing the "triad" of Russia's strategic nuclear forces under the terms of the two treaties; changes in operating costs in view of the deep cuts in strategic offensive arms; and the savings or additional costs stemming from individual provisions of the START II Treaty regulating the modification of launch silos and the reduction of the number of weapons on MIRV'ed ICBMs.

Of course, any estimates to be discussed are relatively provisional, since it is difficult to forecast the level of inflation. Nonetheless, under the terms of the START I Treaty and within the 7 years envisaged for its implementation, the costs of eliminating weapons and military equipment in the "triad" of Russia's strategic nuclear forces will amount to approximately 75-80 billion rubles [R] (with almost R35-40 billion to be spent just until 1997 in terms of mid-1992 prices).

The bulk of these funds—more than 75 percent—are necessary for the decommissioning of submarine guided missile cruisers. The most noteworthy aspect of this item of expenditure is the fact that, in the period up to the year 2000, the terms of the START II Treaty leave it virtually untouched.

Nevertheless, the experts said, in order to rule out any possible charges of unconscientiousness, we will charge these expenditures to the implementation of the terms of the START II Treaty. In that case, according to preliminary estimates, they will come to approximately R15 billion.

Under the terms of the START I Treaty, appropriations for the development [razvitiye] of combat systems for Russia's strategic nuclear forces included: Expenditure on experimental design work on modernizing missile complexes with heavy SS-18 missiles, SS-24 fixed-site and rail-launched missiles, SS-25 fixed-site and land-based missiles, and SS-N-20 SLBMs; expenditure on the series production of modernized ICBMs and SLBMs and on capital construction in the process of deploying them.

But since, as has already been noted, the experimental design and production base for the modernization of SS-18 and SS-24 missiles remains in Ukraine, one of the cheaper options is to develop a single, standardized MIRV'ed ICBM, similar to the SS-24 missile, to be installed in launch

silos—also as a substitute for the 154 heavy missiles permitted under the START I Treaty—and also to be deployed in the rail-launched missile complex.

And now, under the terms of the START II Treaty, expenditure is necessary only to modernize and deploy just the SS-25-type ICBM in the Strategic Rocket Forces and the SS-N-20-type SLBM in the Navy. According to estimates by various Russian Ministry of Defense institutes, appropriations for these purposes in the period up to 2003 will be R100-110 billion less than the similar expenditure under the terms of the START I Treaty.

The operational costs of arms and military equipment will decrease.

As a result of compromises achieved in the last days and even the last hours of the negotiations in Geneva, it is proposed that 90 SS-20 heavy missile launch silos be not destroyed, but converted for the installation of single-warhead ICBMs, which will allow savings of almost R2 billion. On 105 SS-19 ICBM's the number of weapons can be reduced from six to one without altering the platforms, which will enable us to slow down the deployment of modernized fixed-site single-warhead SS-25s and to reduce costs in the period up to 2003 by approximately R35-45 billion.

What Will Happen If the Treaty Is Violated

In the event of the treaty restrictions ceasing to operate, my interlocutors said, the terms of the START II Treaty provide for certain possibilities for relatively expeditious increases in the number of weapons on delivery vehicles. This is linked above all with the rules for reducing the number of weapons on ICBMs and SLBMs, and also with rearming strategic bombers with nuclear weapons in lieu of conventional weapons.

Estimates indicate that, in the event of an accelerated buildup of nuclear forces following a breakdown in the START treaties, the United States will be able to increase within 12-18 months the number of weapons on its "Minuteman-3" ICBMs and its Trident SLBMs from 2,200 units to almost 5,000, and even to 7,000 allowing for weapons in heavy bombers.

Russia's strategic nuclear forces are capable of increasing the number of weapons to 4,500 units within 2-3 years. They will lose out noticeably to the United States on this indicator.

True, as the results of simulated combat capabilities show, the difference in the deterrent potential of the sides will be insignificant; no more than 20 percent in the United States' favor.

The Forecast Instills Optimism

But the START II Treaty, my interlocutors said, is not the end of the road. The future can bring START III, START IV... Maybe this time with other nuclear states.

СНВ-2 УКРЕПЛЯЕТ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ РОССИИ,

считают крупнейшие
отечественные специалисты



Russian Land-Based and Sea-Launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (above); American Land-Based and Sea-Launched ICBMs (below); Missile Silo, Reconfigured for a Single-Warhead Missile

Key: 1. RS-20 (SS-18); 2. RS-22 (SS-24); 3. RS-18 (SS-19); 4. RS-16 (SS-17); 5. RS-12 (SS-13); 6. RS-10 (SS-11); 7. RS-12M (SS-25); 8. RSM-52 (SS-N-20); 9. RSM-54 (SS-N-23); 10. RSM-50 (SS-N-18); 11. RSM-40 (SS-N-8); 12. RSM-25 (SS-N-6); 13. MX; 14. Minuteman; 15. Trident-2; 16. Trident-1; 17. Poseidon S-3; a. Launch weight (tonnes); b. Throw weight (tonnes); c. Number of warheads; d. Protective cover; e. Stop ring; f. Transport-launch canister; g. Reinforced concrete shaft; h. Shock-absorber system; i. Silo wall reinforcement; j. Concrete filling; k. Silo bottom

But the next step, for example, is talks on lowering the ceilings on weapons on strategic missiles and heavy bombers. Our specialists believe that 3,500 warheads is also not a fixed limit.

Agreement could be reached, as an interim move, on our Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers and the United States' B-52 and B-1-B bombers being withdrawn from the strategic nuclear forces in the same way as was done with tactical nuclear weapons.

Agreement should also be reached on limitations on antisubmarine defense. Our country's previous proposals to broach

this problem brought no results. Now, bearing in mind the fact that sea-launched missiles account for almost one-half of the strategic nuclear potential—1,750 weapons—of either side, agreement must be reached to enshrine in a special agreement the survivability of naval forces as a stabilizing, deterrent factor.

Our number of strategic submarines will be reduced. Right now we have 59; 23-25 will be left. Of these six submarines will be of the Typhoon class, seven of the Delta-4 class, and 12 of the Delta-3 class. The Americans

also are banking mainly on submarines, of the Ohio class. Of the 65 "Ohio" submarines they are to keep 18.

Agreement can also be reached on further reductions in the number of warheads on the ballistic missiles on these submarines. This would drastically reduce the total number of weapons. We could accept an agreement on ocean zones free from strategic submarines and on reducing the activity of antisubmarine forces...

Overall, my interlocutors stated, the START II Treaty, although not fault-free, seriously strengthens our state's security. For the first time it steps away from a legalized, mutually agreed, and officially sanctioned strategic arms race, toward radical arms reductions. In addition, the treaty seriously reduces the possibility of a disarming first strike and, at the same time, leaves sufficient potential for retribution, giving Russia a chance to substantially ease the burden of its financial expenditure on maintaining its strategic deterrence forces in the appropriate state.

Ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Supreme Soviet, the fatherland's major strategic arms specialists believe, paves the way to new steps toward strengthening stability on the planet and toward the possibility of carrying out economic reforms in our country more rationally and on a bigger scale.

Russian Expectations of NPT Signing Expressed

Pressure on Ukraine, Kazakhstan to Join

LD2104090393 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
0829 GMT 21 Apr 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Yevgeniy Meneks]

[Text] United Nations April 21 TASS—Russia expects Ukraine and Kazakhstan to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear states, Igor Scherbak, Russian representative, said during general discussions at the UN Disarmament Commission session held here on Tuesday.

Scherbak highly appraised the Supreme Soviet of Belarus's decision regarding its joining the treaty as a non-nuclear state. Russia itself has been observing the treaty in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and is ready to assist the interested parties in fulfilling their commitments under these agreements.

Noting that disarmament ceases to be a "thing in itself" and is becoming ever increasingly integrated into the wider context of international security, the Russian delegate elaborated on the real progress achieved during the preceding years in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

Reminding about the signing of the treaty involving further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons, the Russian delegate emphasised that at the recent summit held in Vancouver the presidents of Russia and the United States had agreed that efforts by

their two countries will be directed to a speedy implementation of START-I and the ratification of START-II.

Further Report

PM2204142793 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 22 Apr 93 p 3

[Report by *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Yevgeniy Meneks: "Russia Hopes for Good Sense From Neighbors"]

[Excerpts] Russia is expecting Ukraine and Kazakhstan to join the Nonproliferation Treaty as nonnuclear states. This was stated by Russian representative Igor Shcherbak, speaking Tuesday during a general discussion at the UN Disarmament Commission that is under way here. [passage omitted]

Were the system of export controls over shipments of "dual-use" materials, equipment, and technologies to become universal, it would be of great practical importance for solving the problem of the nonproliferation of military technologies, Shcherbak stated.

The Russian delegate proposed that a kind of "code of behavior" by the sides in international conflicts be adopted in the very near future. Such a code would envisage—among other restrictive measures—a ban on the use of military aviation, missile and artillery systems, and, in the future, armored equipment too.

Atomic Energy Minister on Enriched Uranium Sales

Interviewed on Talks with U.S.

93WC0054A Moscow *DELOVOY MIR in Russian*
2 Apr 93 p 4

[Interview with Viktor Mikhaylov, minister of atomic energy of the Russian Federation, by Sergey Stepanenko: "The Ministry of Atomic Energy Can Earn \$1.5 Billion Annually for Russia"]

[Text] A delegation from the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation recently returned from a trip to the United States. The greatest part of the talks was about Russia's entering the uranium market of the United States. The delegation was headed by Minister Victor Mikhaylov.

Stepanenko: At the Eighth Congress, your ministry was faulted with the fact that some aspects of the nuclear disarmament agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States do psychological harm to Russia. It is a matter of the American personnel who will stay here.

Mikhaylov: I categorically disagree with this. The agreement provides for assistance to us under a number of supplementary documents that precisely define the procedures for monitoring foreign specialists who will stay here. I will say more than that. We are preparing analogous agreements with France and England and Italy is expressing a desire to join them. This is a positive aspect,

because the dismantling and reduction of nuclear arms is a very big job. There is no reason to refuse qualified help in the current situation. The realization of the agreements is proceeding very tactfully on our side as well as the American side.

Stepanenko: In helping Russia disarm, however, they are not admitting it to the uranium market.

Mikhaylov: As a result of the antidumping campaign in the U.S. uranium market, we missed out on \$200 million last year alone. That is a vexing loss, because our technologies in the uranium industry are the best in the world. I think that it is our priority task to trade in such a commodity. This is the prestige of the country's science and the fruit of its intellect and advanced technological possibilities.

We have somehow become accustomed to putting our hopes only on the pumping of oil and gas. But in so doing, first of all we are impoverishing our own future generations. Secondly, we have backward technologies in the oil and gas industry and hence the endless investments are wasted.

In the recent trip to the United States, we talked a lot and frankly about Russia's entering the American uranium market and about the unfairness of the existing situation. I have every reason to hope that President Clinton's new administration will reexamine the decision on the ban, especially since we have already achieved a lot in this area: in the stage of final negotiations is the important question of quotas and prices, beginning with which Russia will offer its uranium production for sale.

I am categorically against foreign charity. Loans must be taken out only with specific interest rates and a limited payback period. If the Clinton administration really wants to help the new Russia, it will permit us to compete freely in the American market. At the present time, the American uranium industry has a 50 percent share of the world market, whereas we have just under 6 percent. If our colleagues concede 10 percent to us, then with 16 percent we will have \$1.5 billion annually.

The first step in this direction is the signed agreement on the sale in the American market of fuel for nuclear reactors obtained from the highly enriched uranium of dismantled nuclear warheads. The U.S. Department of Energy is prepared under its contracts to sell about 500 tonnes of our product over 20 years. It will be 10 tonnes for the sum of \$200 million in the first year and 25 tonnes the second year. For this purpose, I think it is necessary to establish a Russian-American corporation with joint enterprises, which will dilute our 90-percent product to the levels necessary for the consumer. I met with the new U.S. Secretary of Energy Ms. O'Leary and she agreed to help in the realization of this program.

Stepanenko: Is the U.S. Department of Energy giving enough support?

Mikhaylov: The signed agreement gives us the right to cooperate with private firms as well. We already have a package of proposals from such companies as ABB, Concorde, and other firms. At the present time, the ministry is working on selecting the most advantageous projects for Russia from American corporations.

In my view, no less important is the aspect of the restoration of our old ties last year, including with China, South Korea, Japan, and Iran. Today the Ministry of Atomic Energy has specific agreements with these countries, which permitted us to compensate for the loss of \$200 million in the American market.

Stepanenko: Just about every week we hear about Western countries allocating money for the safety of our nuclear power stations. The sums are in the millions. Where are they going?

Mikhaylov: So far we have only promises of cash, although we are pleased to receive specialists and experts, for we consider their comments in the programs for the modernization of the stations. Such plans exist for every nuclear power station. Moreover, we certify the first-generation stations every year and only after this do we give permission for the next year of operation. For this reason, any expertise from specialists is very important for us.

Western firms have allocated small sums for simulators but this assistance is not just for Russia. These are programs that utilize a colossal scientific-technical potential. Therefore the development of simulators and stands for training personnel is mutually advantageous: we receive first-class equipment and the West gets to know our technologies for the development and operation of nuclear power stations. In any case, such collaboration is an important aspect of the safety of all stations, including those abroad. In my view, there is a mistaken opinion that Russian nuclear power stations are bad and unreliable. Our stations are no worse than the American stations on an international scale.

There is no need to count on any major investments from Western and Japanese firms, for no one in the world can handle the volume of work to raise the safety of our nuclear power stations. This must be done by Russia itself and this is where part of the foreign exchange obtained from the sale of highly enriched uranium will go.

Stepanenko: And the other part for the support of the military-industrial complex?

Mikhaylov: By no means. The conversion programs of the Ministry of Atomic Energy have already gotten well under way, for they are a priority of the branch. By 1995, the military will account for just 8 percent of our total production.

Just think that in 1986 our country's nuclear inventory was more than 40,000 tonnes! The trend of the time dictated that such an arsenal must be reduced. Who can turn time back?

I judge by Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, our primary weapons complexes, where conversion programs have become paramount. A person who has worked on weapons for 20 or 30 years doubtless has a great deal of experience but he always has a desire to try examples in peaceful areas of physics and technology. An example of this is the conversion of weapons-grade uranium into peaceable fuel. Excellent projects are now being prepared for an analogous cycle with weapons-grade plutonium. Russia has taken this course, for real disarmament will begin only with the disappearance of the components from which these weapons are made.

Further on Potential Market

93WC0054B Moscow *DELOVOY MIR in Russian*
6 Apr 93 p 15

[Article by Mikhail Rebrov under "According to Rumors and Authoritatively" rubric: "Uranium Billions: Myths and Reality About Russia's Weapons-Grade Uranium"]

[Text] In the dissonance of recent times about the present and future of Russia, we have heard the theme of the sale of uranium: "With the knowledge of the authorities and with their active participation, highly enriched uranium from the warheads of our missiles is sailing away beyond the ocean and for a trifling sum."

But there is also another theme. It is heard on the lips of those who think that we paid too high a price for the creation of our own nuclear arsenal and that the striving to "cover" Russia with a shield of nuclear missiles resulted in an economic crash and was the reason for many of our troubles today. Is it really so? Where is the truth here and where is naive error or preconceived fiction? It was with these questions that I began my conversation with Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov, minister of atomic energy of the Russian Federation.

His answer was categorical: "Rumors arise through the substitution of terms: not highly enriched but lowly enriched, not nuclear explosives but fuel for peaceful nuclear electric power stations. As for the price of security, here one must count rather than relying on emotionalism."

Now everything in order. Russia is a great nuclear power. This is not just talk but a fact. Because to become such a power, it had to establish a huge scientific and industrial potential and a number of quite new, extremely complex, and science-intensive production systems.

At the present time, more than 100,000 people are working in the country's nuclear-weapons complex, which includes plants for the production of nuclear fuel and munitions and research institutes. More than half a million inhabitants live in closed cities with respect to

security conditions and secrecy (Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-70, Krasnoyarsk-26, and others).

Of course the country's economy requires the review of many tendencies of the past. Of course the people are no longer able to carry on their shoulders the enormous burden of military expenditures. But to be objective, for there is much speculation about nuclear weapons, I will present several figures from a report given by Minister Mikhaylov last summer: "The current expenditures for the maintenance of the nuclear-weapons complex cost us 10 rubles [R] a year from each compatriot. R10 each a year! This is the payment for our independence and our dignity. Each of us gave less than a ruble a month to maintain the country's nuclear potential."

Naturally the inflation processes are changing the "monetary indicators" but the correlation remains. Besides that, on the average about 30 percent of the scientific-production capacities of the nuclear-weapons complex are already working for the national economy, including about 5 percent directly for the manufacture of consumer goods. The conversion plan provides for a doubling of the output of consumer goods by 1995. In so doing, there will be an increase in the production of the goods that are most scarce and science-intensive.

But it would be naive (criminally naive!) to assume that the earthlings have entered into an era without wars. There is a danger that they will flare up. Alas, this is so. Russia's nuclear missile shield guarantees its security. And as important as it is to implement unilateral or bilateral disarmament measures, it is extremely important not to take that last step beyond which the processes are irreversible. After all, ultimately it is not a matter of the number of missiles with nuclear warheads on board but of the scientific-technical potential of the country, which can react flexibly to the possible achievements of other countries in this area. The word "possible" should not be interpreted as something undefined or entirely optional. The Americans have set for themselves a very specific objective: to renew their nuclear-weapons complex in the next two to two and a half decades.

Let us look toward tomorrow, for the past, present, and future are linked. The "uranium project" (let us call it that) was established in the former USSR for the purpose of the accelerated development of nuclear energy and for profoundly military objectives. Both of these tasks were accomplished. Moreover, we accumulated colossal reserves of uranium that are sufficient for the continuous operation of all the nuclear power stations of Russia and the countries of the CIS for 10 to 15 years.

Such is the result of the decades of the "cold war," the senseless development of the nuclear musculature, and the competition with the United States. But now has come what they call the "disarmament era" and the question inevitably arose: What to do with the weapons-grade uranium from the warheads? Its concentration is high—90 percent or more. Then the idea arose of "reprocessing" or "diluting" the highly concentrated uranium

to a natural level so as to obtain lowly enriched power-generating fuel. But since we have an abundance of both, we could sell some of it abroad. And here I want to stipulate separately: the sale of uranium in the world market is one of the most profitable items.

And again a question: Who will enrich unenriched uranium? The answer is clear—Russia. Naturally the Americans will also benefit. The laws of the market are such that everyone will strive to obtain his share. It is another matter what that share is.

Russian uranium (and plutonium as well) is cheaper than American uranium. And although the concentration of uranium-235 in natural "rock" is extremely low—just 0.7 percent, we have efficient technologies for its enrichment. By the way, a concentration of 0.7 percent precludes the use of such uranium in atomic warheads and in most types of nuclear reactors. Enrichment is essential and this requires special technologies, very complex up-to-date equipment, and significant power input. And although many in the West think that Russian technologies are "old-fashioned and mired in the swamp of a ruined economy," the Americans are 15 or even 20 years behind us.

As for the conversion of weapons-grade uranium into power-generating uranium, that is also very profitable, for there is no need to develop mines or to put into operation systems for sublimation, enrichment plants, and so on. The cost of the conversion of the highly enriched uranium contained in nuclear weapons into unenriched uranium (more accurately, of the needed concentration) is substantially lower than in conventional production.

And here is still another argument for the doubters. The total reserves of uranium on the planet are estimated at 15 million tonnes. Of that amount, deposits with a total "capacity" of 2.7 million tonnes are considered reliable or, as the specialists say, "geologically mapped." As applied to the USSR, these figures were strictly secret until recently. They have now been published: about 45 percent of world reserves.

"The fissionable materials contained in our nuclear arsenals," the minister said, "make up a large passive reserve that can be turned into a source of hard currency, above all for the purpose of the conversion of the nuclear-weapons complex for the realization of the program for the ecological restoration of Russia and the establishment of our own national fund for the support of Russian science. Digressing from momentary benefits, I will say that the sale of uranium will benefit Russia rather than the Western countries through our debts...."

Thus, at the end of February of this year, an agreement was signed between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States on the utilization of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons. It is expected that the value of the uranium sold will be \$8-9 billion (Russia's receipts will be \$150-200 million a year in the first 5 years and will

increase after that). At the same time, the American side agreed to purchase additional Russian unenriched uranium (4-5 percent of the isotope uranium-235) in 1993 for \$115 million.

Thus, the very fact of Russia's entering the world market with a high level of competition and with a high added value of uranium production is itself noteworthy. What else will we get from this agreement? Professor Mikhaylov presented some weighty arguments here as well:

"This will make it possible to establish a production system for the reprocessing of highly enriched uranium into power-producing uranium and ensure that it will work at capacity for a long time, to increase the load on existing separating capacities, and to reduce state expenditures for the storage of nuclear materials freed as a result of disarmament. It will also contribute to the further strengthening of trust between Russia and the United States...."

All of this is so. But I repeat that the market is the market. The entrance of our uranium there evoked the displeasure of certain circles in the United States. They spoke of sanctions against Russia and initiated a so-called "dumping investigation." Yes, the price of processed uranium ore in the U.S. market fell, which caused a reduction of the amount mined. And since the interests of its own nuclear industry are closer to the U.S. Department of Energy than those of the Russian industry, it wanted to mediate under conditions very favorable to itself. The Ministry of Atomic Energy sees things differently. As the minister stated, he does not intend to "feed" foreign bureaucrats and will continue to work for our own rights and interests. In short, Russia will not agree to any discriminatory conditions.

And still another important aspect. The signed agreement strictly limits the scope of the utilization of uranium purchased from us: it can be used only for peaceful purposes. And this will help in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, accounting for all nuclear materials, their "physical protection," and hence the conservation of the environment.

Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister on Debate With Russia

*AU2704085193 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 24 Apr 93 p 5*

[Interview with Borys Ivanovych Tarasyuk, Ukraine's deputy minister of foreign affairs, by Oleh Oliynyk; place and date not given: "Nuclear Weapons as an Irritation Factor"—first two paragraphs published in boldface]

[Text] Over the last week or two, Ukraine and Russia have exchanged statements, at various levels, on strategic nuclear weapons, statements that may be looked upon as signs of growing tension in interstate relations.

Such notions as "ultimatum, pressure, violation of agreements, blackmail, and intimidation..." abound in the statements.

Does the situation regarding nuclear weapons in Ukraine really require extraordinary measures to be taken or are certain circles simply interested in causing a deterioration in relations? The URYADOVYY KURYER editorial board turned to Borys Tarasyuk, deputy minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the National Committee for Questions of Disarmament, to comment upon the recent events.

Tarasyuk: This exchange of statements and speeches may, at face value, look quite serious. However, here, it is also necessary to see who is causing tension and why. Of course, Ukraine has many problems. Russia also has no less if no more of them, but while Ukraine focuses its attention on resolving its internal problems and on developing its institutions of an independent state, Russia finds time for making accusations against us.

We are now obviously dealing with yet another stage of implementing the policy of "special responsibility" for the events that are taking place on the territory of the former Union, a policy that has been adopted by Russia. We are witnessing a consistent implementation of such a concept: These are questions of USSR's assets and debts, the division of the Black Sea Fleet, and territorial claims upon Ukraine. Speaking of the more specific reasons for the outbreak in the exchange of statements, in my opinion, first, Russia insists on changing the status of strategic offensive weapons that are located on our territory and strives to place them under its own jurisdiction; second, Russia wants to deprive Ukraine of its confirmed right to keep the components of the nuclear weapons—both strategic and tactical, that were transferred to Russia last year.

Ukraine cannot agree to altering the status of strategic offensive weapons on its own territory, because this status was specified by heads of four nuclear states—former USSR republics: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine—in the Minsk agreement of 30 December 1991. Russia was the first to decide to change this status last fall, having subordinated strategic weapons to the "strategic missile troops" of the Russian Federation. After this, Russia succeeded in imposing such a status on Belarus. It is now Ukraine's turn.

Ukraine insists that these weapons should remain under the operational control of the joint command of the CIS Strategic Forces. Ukraine responded to Russia's unilateral actions in autumn 1992 by instituting administrative subordination of the strategic weapons on its territory to Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, something that does not contradict accords within the framework of the CIS or regulations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to which Ukraine is not yet a signatory.

Ukraine insisted and continues to insist that it must have a right to a compensation for the components of the nuclear weapons. What is meant is highly enriched

uranium that may be used as fuel at atomic electric power plants and valuable metals. We are declaring our economic interests and not about our intention to possess weapons as such.

The Russian side also accuses the Ukrainian side of allegedly not allowing specialists to take care of these weapons, as a result of which the level of safety at nuclear missile complexes has markedly deteriorated. This is not borne out in reality. It was precisely Ukraine that proposed, one year ago, that an agreement be signed on servicing these complexes. These questions were not resolved and are increasingly becoming a matter for speculation, so that Ukraine suggested holding full-scale negotiations in November 1992. It was not until the middle of January 1993 that we received an affirmative reply from Russia. Two rounds of negotiations have already been held. In order to rule out any bias or speculations regarding nuclear safety, Ukraine's Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, in their statement on 31 March 1993, offered to the Russian side to consider the possibility of inviting an authoritative international commission. To this day, we have not received any answer. It appears that such a variant does not fit the plan for disinformation, whose implementation we are now witnessing.

Oliynyk: President L. Kravchuk proposed that the discussion of the problem of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine be held at prime ministerial level. Is there any progress here?

Tarasyuk: There is still no reply. Anyway, we still hope to receive it.

Oliynyk: An opinion has lately prevailed among some specialists in the sphere of international law to the effect that Ukraine does not yet, in fact, have any juridical obligations before the world community regarding its nuclear status and that even particular statements of the Declaration of Ukraine's State Sovereignty or the signing of some international agreements are not yet legal acts. Well, does Ukraine still remain free in its choice or has the situation already been specified in advance?

Tarasyuk: Ukraine is not yet a signatory to either START-1, or the Lisbon Protocol, or the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That is why there are no grounds for stating that Ukraine is violating its obligations. However, there are other questions. These are questions of our own principles of external and internal policy. They were specified in the Declaration of State Sovereignty that was adopted on 16 July 1991. It was, for the first time, declared that Ukraine intends to become a nuclear-free state and to adhere to three nonnuclear principles. This document has determined, for many years ahead, the trends of the building of the Ukrainian state.

It was precisely Ukraine that advanced in April 1992, at the conference of ministers of foreign affairs of four nuclear states—former USSR republics—the idea of an

international document that would provide a legal foundation for an equal participation of these states in the START Treaty. As a result, the Lisbon Protocol was elaborated and signed on 23 May 1992, and Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the United States are its signatories. It is this document that gives the Ukrainian parliament the right to ratify the START Treaty and that attests, to the fact, recognized by the United States and Russia, that Ukraine is an equal successor to the former Union.

Oliynyk: Borys Ivanovych, do the positions maintained by Russia and by the United States in their attitude toward the problem of nuclear weapons in Ukraine coincide on many points or do they differ?

Tarasyuk: In my personal opinion, the United States is mostly interested in raising the level of its security, because the overwhelming majority of strategic nuclear weapons located on the territory of the former USSR, including Ukraine, used to be aimed precisely at U.S. facilities. Very few people know at what exactly they are aimed, but there is no doubt that they are aimed at the United States. It is understandable why Americans show such a concern about the given question. Besides, some states, members of the nuclear club, that have the status of permanent members of the UN Security Council, something that places upon them particular responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, are in no hurry to change the existing geopolitical structure. If new nuclear powers emerge, the question arises of their status in world policy. However, in accordance with the past rules, nuclear states are permanent members of the Security Council, but here all seats have already been occupied.

Oliynyk: However, in the main directions of our state's external policy, Russia is regarded as a strategic partner in the east.

Tarasyuk: Ukraine has declared its intention not to join any military alliances. For that reason, we have not joined the Tashkent agreement on collective security and are not negotiating joining NATO. At the same time, we do not rule out the broad development of cooperation with international military and political organizations, including the Joint Command of the CIS Strategic Forces. Ukraine is interested in the development of mutually advantageous partnership relations on a bilateral basis with all states, primarily with its neighbors. They have priority in our external policy.

Ukrainians Debate Nuclear Status

Parliament Decides Military Doctrine Must Be Amended

*LD2604125993 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1100 GMT 26 Apr 93*

[Text] The Ukrainian Parliament has decided that Ukraine's military doctrine it discussed for several days must be amended with a number of deputies rejecting

the clause which says that Ukraine adheres to non-nuclear principles and opposes the proliferation of existing technologies for the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the development of new ones. According to them this will turn Ukraine into a backward country and halt scientific progress. At the same time some deputies reportedly see in the doctrine rapprochement with NATO and a belittling of relations with Russia.

Environment Minister on Ratification of START I Treaty

*LD2504142293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in English 0000 25 Apr 93*

[Text] Speaking at a press conference in Kiev after the Verkhovna Rada's closed session deliberations about ratification of the START I Treaty, Ukraine's Minister for Natural Environment Protection and Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada ad hoc Committee on Preparing the Ratification, Yuriy Kostenko, said the nation's nuclear disarmament in the current crisis would require about three billion U.S. dollars. This estimate resulted from a thorough study jointly conducted by leading experts with Ukrainian academic and defense industry enterprises and MPs on related Verkhovna Rada standing committees who considered both the immediate and more distant effects of nuclear disarmament on the national economy as well as its manifold political and societal implications.

Among some crucial aspects of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, the issue of fissionable materials and their disposal including utilization by the nuclear power industry stood prominent.

The ICBM silos destruction as insisted on by the United States under the START I signed by the United States and the late USSR over a decade ago is also a formidable task involving huge expenditures Ukraine will hardly be able to bear unaided, Mr. Kostenko maintained. He added the ratification issue was closely tied to Ukraine's military doctrine, largely unshaped and unformulated yet. Should the ICBMs be removed from combat duty their maintenance might be highly problematic and environmental risks running too high to be acceptable, the Environmental Protection Minister warned.

While Ukraine is de facto a nuclear power innocent of any international legal norm violations it continues to experience constant pressures on the part of other states, Russia in particular. The latter threatened to discontinue nuclear supplies to Ukraine if Ukraine fails to ratify the START I and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this Russia was immediately joined by France and Canada, Mr. Kostenko complained. He further disclaimed Russia's unilateral and undivided right to all the former USSR's strategic missile warheads, though admitted that Russia alone had capabilities to service them. Mr. Kostenko denied speculation about Ukraine's ICBMs



Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko. Photo from Kiev Television, 5 March 1993

becoming increasingly dangerous through negligence and inadequate maintenance. He said the warheads' life span was far from exhausted.

Commission Chief Denies 'Dragging Out' START Ratification

*PM2304144693 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Apr 93 First Edition p 6*

[Unattributed report: "Material Prosperity Is the Main Thing"]

[Text] "Accusations that Ukraine is reluctant to ratify the START I Treaty are unfounded. What is happening is the normal process of parliamentary examination of a very important document which will have great significance for Ukraine's national security and, most important, for its material prosperity." This was stated at a press conference by Yuriy Kostenko, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet special deputies' commission

on questions of ratification of the START I Treaty and minister of environmental conservation.

"We are not dragging out the ratification process, we are studying the matter in depth," Yuriy Kostenko stressed. As he said, the U.S. Congress spent a year and a half examining the treaty, while the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has been doing so for less than 3 months. The implementation of nuclear disarmament, Yuriy Kostenko went on, will, according to very rough calculations, require some 3 billion U.S. dollars. "Such sums must be found from somewhere, since we cannot count particularly on aid from outside (the United States has promised, for instance, only \$175 million for these purposes). Yet keeping nuclear weapons costs much less than disarmament."

"Ukraine," Yuriy Kostenko said, "wants to take on commitments it can fulfill. We are also raising the question of destroying nuclear weapons, rather than transporting them from one territory to another. Otherwise security for some countries will be achieved at the cost of reducing security for others."

"From the legal viewpoint Russia is taking an unlawful step by trying to declare the strategic nuclear forces of the former USSR to be its own property," Yuriy Kostenko noted.

Price for Nuclear Disarmament Named

*LD2304201593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1918 GMT 23 Apr 93*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Sergey Balykov for TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 23 Apr—Ukraine will require about \$3 billion at current prices for full nuclear disarmament. This information was cited today by Environmental Protection Minister Yuriy Kostenko at a news conference on the results of a closed parliamentary sitting which was devoted to the preparation of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons for ratification and to the acquisition of non-nuclear status by Ukraine. Ukraine, he said, is a nuclear power which has so far never violated a single international legal norm. Nevertheless, it is under constant pressure from other countries. In particular, it is under pressure from Russia, which has stated that if Ukraine fails to sign the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, it will suspend the delivery of nuclear fuel for a nuclear power station and stop rendering technical assistance. Russia, in the opinion of Yuriy Kostenko, has no rights to warheads, but it is only Russia that can maintain them. Therefore, appropriate agreements were signed with Russian enterprises with regard to the maintenance of nuclear weapons. Yuriy Kostenko denied reports that nuclear weapons in Ukraine are in a dangerous state. All nuclear warheads on the Ukrainian territory are within the guaranteed period during which they can be safely kept, he stressed.

Debate in Parliament

*LD2204115293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1105 GMT 22 Apr 93*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Mikhail Melnik for TASS]

[Text] Kiev April 22 TASS—The Ukrainian parliament met behind closed doors again on Thursday to continue debates about the republic's military doctrine. Pivotal is the question about Ukraine's proclaimed non-nuclear status which is opposed by some members of the parliament on the ground that Ukraine is a nuclear power de facto.

The parliament is discussing a package of documents relating to military affairs after hearing President Leonid Kravchuk's report on Wednesday.

Supreme Council Discusses Defense Issues

*LD2004200193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 20 Apr 93*

[Text] A closed plenary sitting of the Supreme Council of Ukraine took place on 20 April. The issue of the draft military doctrine of our state was examined. Additional work was done on this, taking into account proposals and observations expressed by people's deputies during examination of the draft at the sixth session of the Supreme Council on 28 October last year.

President Leonid Kravchuk delivered a report. Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov delivered a report on the structure, numbers, and program of reduction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Information was heard from Viktor Antonov, minister of machine-building, the military-industrial complex and conversion, on the defense adequacy and conversion of Ukraine's industry.

Information about the state of talks between the government delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation regarding nuclear disarmament was given by Yuriy Kostenko, minister of the environment and leader of the state delegation. Information about the talks between the state delegations of Ukraine and Russia regarding the Black Sea Fleet was delivered by Vasyl Durdynets, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council and head of Ukraine's state delegation.

It was decided to continue examining these issues at a plenary sitting on 22 April.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Spells Out Stance

*LD2104155193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 20 Apr 93*

[Text] [Announcer] The briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, which took place on 20 April, was devoted to explaining the position of the Ukrainian delegation on issues of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine in the talks with Russia's delegation. Our diplomats were forced to return to this issue by accusations in the Moscow newspapers IZVESTIYA and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA which distort Ukraine's position regarding nuclear weapons. Here is Anatoliy Komirenko with more details about this:

[Komirenko] Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, head of the Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for Issues of Disarmament and Arms Limitation, noted in his remarks to journalists that almost a month has passed since the last round of talks between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian side desired to reach a compromise at the talks. However, so-called newspaper diplomacy began on Russia's part. Returning to the subject of the talks themselves, Mr. Hryshchenko noted:

[begin Hryshchenko recording] The talks were held on issues of the status of strategic nuclear forces deployed on Ukraine's territory, on issues of utilization of nuclear

components which, following the dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads, could be used, for example, as fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power stations or in some other way, and on issues of ensuring the nuclear safety of strategic nuclear forces located here.

Ukraine's position is fairly well known, but the main thing is that we would like it to be heard. Unfortunately, it has happened, and is still happening, that we are not heard, and not because they [as heard] cannot hear us, but because they do not want to, because Ukraine's position on these issues is correct, and it is after all fairly difficult to deny this without distortions. [end recording]

[Komirenko] Mr. Hryshchenko went on to emphasize that the nuclear weapons which we inherited from the former Soviet Union were created by the efforts of all the peoples which were part of the Union without regard for the will of the majority of all peoples. After the break-up of the Union, one of the successor states, with equal rights just like the others, insisted and very much wanted to be a nuclear state, and this was Russia.

But proceeding from an analysis of the range of observations, including political, geo-strategic, and economic, the Supreme Council placed Ukraine's intentions to become non-nuclear in the future in the declaration on state sovereignty. The strategic nuclear forces located on our territory were transferred to the operational control of the joint command of strategic forces of the CIS in accordance with a whole series of inter-state accords. That is, these forces have never been under the jurisdiction of any other state, either legally or in fact.

Russia treats the issue as if it were the only successor of the USSR, in particular regarding nuclear weapons, and it is because of this that strategic forces should be subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of Russia. This leads to the fact that there will be foreign troops on Ukraine's territory. Mr. Hryshchenko specially drew the journalists' attention to the following aspect of the matter:

[begin Hryshchenko recording] At the talks our side emphasized that really all materials which are constituents of nuclear weapons are our property, namely materials, namely constituents [as heard]. We do not lay claim to control, to ownership of nuclear warheads, which are meant for only one thing—a nuclear explosion. That is, the quality of nuclear weapons does not interest us here. We are interested in the material part—the utilization of those materials which the people of Ukraine took part in creating and producing, although they themselves did not want to.

In this connection the issue has arisen, and it arises and is still there, on how nuclear and other materials will be utilized, which (?have been removed) and are now being removed from tactical nuclear weapons taken away to Russia in the spring of 1992 for dismantling and destruction. We did not renounce the right of ownership of nuclear materials at any stage. The Russian side is refusing even to discuss this issue. Then doubt really

does arise as to what guarantees we will have, even if we agree, about the dismantling of strategic charges [boy-ezaryady] in Russia, whether there will not be another change of position regarding even discussing this issue. [end recording]

[Komirenko] On the principles of standing up for these interests, Kostyantyn Hryshchenko noted, Ukraine, whatever pressure may be put on it, cannot agree to there being foreign troops on its territory, and cannot agree to signing agreements which would cause it material losses.

Commentators Support Retention of Nuclear Weapons

934K0804A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
20 Mar 93 p 12

[Article by Viktor Mironchenko and Nikolay Proko-penko: "Once Again on the Subject of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Kiev—The main flaw in the military doctrine rejected by the parliament can be seen even by the naked eye: It is based on a nonnuclear status for Ukraine.

The problem of Ukraine's nuclear status is still being intently debated in the press. Several circumstances are feeding the animation of this debate. The first is the signing of the Russian-American START II treaty, a second is the approach of the time for the ratification by Ukraine of the START I treaty, and a third is the work on and discussion of the Ukraine's national security doctrine in the Ukrainian parliament.

It is impossible to understand from the standpoint of common sense why the Ukrainian army must abandon nuclear weapons. For it already has these weapons. And it is precisely these weapons that constitute a deterrent factor by forcing other states to consider carefully the consequences of possible military actions against a nuclear power, and preventing military adventures. And in combination with missiles it is simply a reliable shield and a guarantee for the independence of the young state. And now, for incomprehensible reasons and with no sound justification, we must give up the nuclear missile shield and build a doctrine of national security on this!

The Ukrainian parliament announced its intention of becoming a nonnuclear state during the period when Ukraine was part of the USSR. Hence its integrity and inviolability were guaranteed by the entire might of the Union. The situation has now changed. The Union has disintegrated and Ukraine must itself be concerned with its own defense. Under these conditions, to surrender nuclear weapons means to deprive the young state of the means of military defense. And this at a time when dozens of countries possess nuclear weapons. Today 30 of them are ready in scientific and technical terms to manufacture them, and almost 15 are on the threshold of developing their own nuclear weapons.

Everyone in the world knows that the possession of nuclear missile weapons makes it possible to create an army that is numerically small but unbelievably strong in terms of its fire power. The availability of these weapons makes military development economical and makes it possible to free up hundreds of thousands of able-bodied men and use them in the production sphere. This is precisely the road that Russia is taking as it starts to reconstruct its strategic nuclear missile forces. This was stated recently in an interview given to IZVESTIYA by that country's deputy defense minister, Andrey Kokoshin. It is worth listening to the generals in the Ukrainian army, and to the calculations that they put forward: "...the missile troops are the least expensive branch of the armed forces. They are capable of resolving 60-100 percent of strategic missions but require only five or six percent of the entire military budget. And seven percent is spent to maintain personnel, nine percent on capital construction, and four percent on scientific research and research-and-design work."

This simple truth is well understood in France and England, which long ago set out on that path. Foreign experts unanimously assert that nuclear forces are the least expensive and most effective means of deterrence. Unfortunately, however, for some reason this truth cannot be understood by our Ministry of Defense, or the president, or the Supreme Soviet. True, a certain shift can supposedly be seen at the top level toward recognizing the reality. This is precisely why when announcing that it is not about to abandon the proclaimed course of nonnuclear status, Ukraine pragmatically made this course conditional on certain economic and political guarantees.

Let us deal with the positions of those who, emphasizing in every possible way their own competence in the problem being debated, counsel in favor of immediate and unconditional dismantling of Ukraine's nuclear shield. The essence of this has been set forth with the didactic tone of the military erudition inherent in Colonel V. Izmalkov in an article entitled "A Nuclear Missile Is a Stone Axe," published in GOLOS UKRAINY on 22 December last year. The implication of this clearly anti-Ukrainian piece contains the warning "What do you want, nasty little Ukrainian. Look at him, what will he want next? Give him nuclear weapons! This is not a stone axe we're talking about here!"

This is the correct interpretation of the implication. But outwardly the arguments appear solid and sound. The author tries to clarify what challenges to Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence nuclear weapons could neutralize. He names the "neighbor to the north," and also certain political forces in Romania and the former Czechoslovakia. It turns out that strategic nuclear weapons are not suitable to oppose those states. What is needed here is tactical nuclear weapons, which, you will recall, were removed from Ukraine in May last year. Well, he says, at that time it was necessary to raise the question of Ukraine's nuclear status. "But where were N. Porovskiy, S. Khmara, and V. Tolubko and their

supporters then?" V. Izmalkov asks, becoming a threatening accuser. "These weapons were removed into Russia. All that is left is ambitions."

And we make bold to ask Mr. Colonel V. Izmalkov, people's deputy of Ukraine, this: And where were you (only a lieutenant colonel at the time) when the warheads of operational-tactical missiles were being taken to Russia? For, in your own words, it was precisely "this class of weapons that would meet Ukraine's strategic missions in terms of range and power." It turns out both then and now that since he is an officer and a people's deputy, V. Izmalkov understands perfectly well the role and importance of operational-tactical nuclear weapons, and he did not lift a finger to bring this knowledge to his colleague deputies and the public at large, or oppose the removal of these weapons from Ukraine.

The voice of V. Izmalkov, a military expert, should have been heard at full force when this important defensive-strategic task was being resolved. For the overwhelming majority of deputies in the Ukrainian parliament are civilians who are not very knowledgeable about military affairs. But V. Izmalkov remained silent then. But now, when the warheads have been removed, he is archly demonstrating his erudition and jeering at patriotic deputies.

In the example of V. Izmalkov we can clearly see how political passions and political struggle are interfering with deputies of the Ukrainian parliament as they try to serve the national interests, forcing us to wave our fists only after the battle.

The enemies of our reliable defense have won the first half of Ukraine's nuclear disarming. Medium-range nuclear weapons have been removed to Russia, which has appropriated them. For there is no information that the warheads have all really been dismantled, as was stipulated in the terms. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia, with the active cooperation of our Ukrainian military "experts" who hold high ranks in the political echelons of power, are strongly pushing Ukraine toward accomplishing the second and final stage of nuclear disarming.

In the Russian and Western press noise is being made about Ukraine's "indeterminate" and "ambiguous" position in matters pertaining to nuclear disarmament. The stream of accusations has increased particularly following the conclusion of the Russian-American START II treaty and the approach of the period for START I and the Lisbon Protocol to be considered in the Ukrainian parliament.

People's Deputy Izmalkov and his supporters claim that nothing is left for us to do but acquiesce to these acts. They are bringing all arguments to bear, from the supposed insurmountable technical and technological difficulties to economic problems. What, they say, will our people say when they see the empty shelves in the stores and know how much is being spent on strategic missiles?

This populist pathetic element is false and hypocritical through and through. Why, for example, would Izmalkov, as an expert, not explain to voters that, as has been mentioned earlier, nuclear missile forces are the least expensive branch of the armed forces since they need only one-twentieth of the defense budget appropriations to maintain themselves?

In Russia, which is also experiencing economic crisis, military figures are trying in every way possible to propagandize the course of reconstruction of nuclear weapons that has been taken, emphasizing its economic expediency. But here they are hiding this information, and the people are being scared off by the billions needed to develop nuclear programs.

Here it would be necessary to state candidly that the unique situation with respect to Ukraine's acquisition of the status of a nuclear power is that, as in Russia, it has no need to develop nuclear armed forces from nothing. They already exist and are standing at the launch sites on our land. And they will cost as much as our security requires. If, of course, we do not ship them in a north-easterly direction because of our thoughtlessness and stupidity.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Conversion of Rocket Into Satellite Vehicle Hailed LD2604172293

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1400 GMT on 24 April carries a 3-minute report on a conversion project that has resulted in the launch of a START I carrier rocket.

The announcer notes that the project was spearheaded by the (IVK) joint-stock company and the Kompleks scientific and technological center after specialists suggested that some of the intercontinental ballistic missiles which are to be destroyed under the terms of the Russian-U.S. START I Treaty could be used to launch small spacecraft.

Kompleks Director (Yuriy Solomonov) notes in a recorded interview that this is an example of practical conversion in which ways were found to use the scientific and production potential of his enterprise and enterprises working in related spheres to begin and successfully complete the work. He says that it was not a simple conversion of technologies which until recently had been used and are still used for defense, but a search for a way which would enable the complex to be used for the benefit of those directly involved and those providing services, to carry out launches not only in Russia but abroad as well.

The announcer points out that this is the first time that an experimental satellite weighing 250 kg had been launched by a solid-propellant ballistic missile, known abroad as the SS-25. It was necessary to design an additional stage to accomplish the goal. The START I

rocket-space complex can place satellites of twice the weight—up to 550 kg—into orbit. (Solomonov) also noted that the work was not financed from the budget but by Russian investors.

Commander of Formerly Secret 'Space Force' Describes Unit

OW2304035693 Tokyo KYODO in English 0338 GMT
23 Apr 93

[Text] Moscow, April 23 KYODO—Russian defense authorities continue to maintain a "space force" even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War tensions, according to the commander of the formerly secret military department.

Gen. Vladimir Ivanov told KYODO NEWS SERVICE recently the "space force" emerged as an independent entity within the Russian Defense Ministry after being a secret part of the now defunct Soviet Union's Strategic Rocket Force (SRF).

The old SRF was responsible for putting Soviet satellites into orbit, reconnaissance by satellites, and intercepting any attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union, however, the Russian military has been renamed and the "space force" elevated to a level in the Defense Ministry on a par with the Russian ground, naval, and air forces.

It has been an open secret among Western military sources that the old Soviet military, like the U.S., had a corps in charge of its own Star Wars strategy, but this is the first time a Russian authority has confirmed its existence.

According to Ivanov, near the end of the 1950s when the Soviet Union succeeding in developing its rockets and missiles, the predecessor of the "space force" was established as part of the SRF.

It continued its activities in secret and became the independent "space corps" in 1982.

Last year, the "space force" was placed on a level with the other forces of the Defense Ministry, and was renamed in January this year.

According to the commander, the headquarters of the "space force" is at Plesetsk, a military base some 800 kilometers north of Moscow, with the bulk of the forces deployed there and at the once secret base at Baykonur in Kazakhstan.

Ivanov did not say whether Russia is developing technology in response to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), under which satellites are being developed that can shoot down missiles after they have been launched.

The space force continues to manage not only Russia's military satellites, but also the Mir space station, and also monitors the satellites of other nations.

Ivanov called for cooperation in the development of manned space flights, adding that this could play a major role in promoting international peace.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Further Development of MiG-29M Fighter Reportedly Blocked

PM2604135393 Moscow Ostankino Television First
Channel Network in Russian 0725 GMT 25 Apr 93

[From the "Military Review" program: Video report by S. Tolstoy and M. Zverev, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [Tolstoy over video of fighter taking off, attributed to VoenTV (Military TV Studio)] Any country which is concerned about the development of its armed forces has both heavy and light fighters in its arsenal. It has to be admitted that as for the latter, we have been lagging behind the best foreign aircraft of this type. Now such an aircraft has been created. It is the MiG-29M super-fighter. It has to

be noted that all it has in common with the well-known MiG-29 is its name. Essentially, this is a fundamentally new machine. Its combat potential has been raised several-fold. It is also worth noting that this fighter has almost fully completed its test and design stage.

Suddenly an order blocking further development has been issued. Why? Does the new machine lack prospects?

[R. Taskayev, MiG Design Bureau senior test pilot, identified by caption] Everyone agrees that there is no better aircraft for aerial combat, for dog fights.

[Tolstoy] Hardly anyone will question the need to cut defense spending, but surely it is not necessary to go to such unreasonable lengths. Clearly, we are once again making a mistake here, if we are prepared to give up a fighter aircraft for which foreign buyers are already waiting in line. [video shows aircraft taking off, close up of fighter on the ground and its under-wing missiles, interview with test pilot, formation]



Russian Troop Withdrawal From Germany Proceeding Relatively Smoothly

Troops Selling Off Equipment to Locals

93WC0051A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 12, Mar 93 pp 24-27

[Article by Konstantin Isakov: "A Bordello at an Officer's Home: The Russian Troops Are Retreating in an Organized Manner, Selling Off Everything in Their Wake"]

[Text] With great trepidation of the soul, Germany awaits the day and the hour when the last Russian soldier will leave the territory of his erstwhile most dangerous enemy.

They will stop paying for services which nobody in Germany has needed for a long time now from the federal treasury, that is, from the taxpayer's purse. The flights of Russian aviation and the roar of tanks which disrupt the peaceful slumber of federal citizens will cease. It is possible that they will succeed in restoring the landscape and the environment relatively quickly, in freeing the landscapes of tank ranges, shooting ranges, and the dumps of rusty materiel. The Germans also hope that the countless commercial machinations of the Russian military personnel will stop.

Orderlies and Schnapps

Units of the Red Army were granted the status of "the group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany" on 10 June 1945. Until the fall of 1949 they were subordinated to the Soviet military administration in Germany. The adjective "occupation" was excised from the official name of Soviet troops after the emergence of the German Democratic Republic. Finally, on 29 June 1989, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany was renamed the Western Group of Forces.

Despite the name change, the tasks of the most powerful Soviet military grouping in Eastern Europe did not change. Eight motorized rifle divisions and one brigade, eight armor divisions and one artillery battalion, and five air armifles (most divisions were Guards)—about 338,000 soldiers and officers, tens of thousands of tanks, thousands of artillery and mortar pieces, planes, and helicopters, and hundreds of ballistic nuclear missiles—were assigned to break through the enemy's defenses and mount a rapid offensive against the West.

On one occasion, in a setting conducive to a confidential conversation, a lieutenant colonel of the Bundeswehr told me about his erstwhile fears.

"For a long time I served at the eastern border of the FRG. We were opposed by the Soviet Eighth Guards Army on the territory of the GDR. We always knew that the Russians would break through our defenses anyway in the event of war, even given that NATO troops would support us. However, we truly understood how menacing the enemy was only after the unification of Germany. As

a member of a group of inspectors, I ended up in the vicinity of Erfurt at the location of one of the divisions of the Eighth Army. Its material supply was designed to outfit two divisions; correspondingly, it could have been increased by a factor of two within days. The formation of the troops was such that upon receiving orders for the offensive, they would not have needed a lengthy rearrangement or regrouping. It would have sufficed to roll the guns to their emplacements and drive the tanks out of the hangars. We were struck not only by the might, but also by the lack of correspondence between the cleanliness of the barracks and the brilliance of materiel, and the wretched life of Soviet soldiers and officers..."

For their part, East Germans who had lived side by side with Soviet troops for 40 years were struck by something else: that, unofficially, almost every Soviet officer had a soldier as an orderly (in Germany, this was the case only in the Kaiser's army at the beginning of the century), and that any sergeant would trade a couple canisters of gasoline, a handful of cartridges, binoculars, entrenching tools, or something equally useful in the household for a bottle of schnapps.

The Germans Are Paying

An agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the eastern part of united Germany was achieved on 16 July 1990, in Zheleznovodsk, during a meeting between USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Conditions for the temporary stay and the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territories of five new federal lands of Germany were codified on 12 October 1990 in Bonn. Under this treaty, the troops were to retire completely from the promised land of Germany by 31 December 1994.

This rapid withdrawal produced the effect of an exploding charge in the conservative circles of the Soviet military, and came close to compelling them to make a last and decisive stand against the politicians.

Chief of the General Staff General Moiseyev (he was removed after the putsch) insisted that the Soviet troops stay in Germany as long as the American troops were there. According to Moiseyev, the withdrawal of the troops itself should take no less than seven years. At a meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Colonel Alksnis and Colonel Petrushenko demanded that the withdrawal be stretched out over 16 to 19 years.

However, the politicians of Moscow remained faithful to the signed agreements, all the more so because, under the terms of the treaty, Germany undertook to pay virtually all outlays on the stay and withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Germany undertook to pay 3 billion marks to cover current expenditures of the army. Another 11 billion marks were allocated to defray transportation expenditures associated with the troop withdrawal. The German side undertook the financing of programs for the retraining of servicemen, earmarking for this another 200 million marks. Some 7.8 billion marks were allocated to build 36,000 apartments with a total floor space

of 2 million square meters and four housing construction combines with a yearly output of 100,000 square meters of housing. In total, it came to 12 billion marks plus 3 billion marks in interest-free credit.

In 1991 and 1992, 60 percent of the personnel, materiel, and armaments, and material and technical assets were withdrawn from the territory of Germany. The Russian troops vacated 468 out of the 777 military settlements. Germany received 15 airfields and 101 training grounds.

The large-scale military, economic, and transportation operation is without parallel in the world. Such is the opinion of Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, voiced at a recent press conference at the Berlin branch of the Russian Embassy in Germany which the Berlin correspondent of NOVOYE VREMYA, Boris Lysenko, attended.

However, in December 1992 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl requested in Moscow that the withdrawal of the troops be speeded up still further. He promised additional cash funds in return. President Boris Yeltsin made the concession.

The deadline for the withdrawal of the troops was moved up 4 months. In return, Russia received 550 million marks for putting up servicemen and a deferral of the payments of a 5 billion debt to the former East Germany. The Federal Government would have gladly made other compromises to have the Russian troops leave sooner. However, Russian servicemen do not share this desire, and they have weighty reasons for this.

Danilo the Cracker Jack

First, Soviet soldiers and officers in Germany receive extra pay in convertible currency on top of their ruble wages. A private receives 25 marks monthly, a warrant officer—600 marks, a lieutenant—900 marks, and a colonel—1,500 marks. Second, officers and warrant officers have a virtually unlimited opportunity to master the skills of free and very free enterprise.

To be sure, it has not yet come to massive trading in weapons. The German police have registered only 16 instances of such transactions. However, in most other cases, the complicity of Russian servicemen is hard to prove. For example, 57 cases of hand grenades and four cases of antitank mines were found in a vacant house in Dresden, but it is not known whose gear that was.

Thanks to the efforts of reporters from the magazines DER SPIEGEL and FOCUS, the lively trade in consumer goods and real estate, and the sale of military gear, fuel, and lubricants, which blossoms in the currently not so numerous barracks of foreign troops, have ceased to be secret... Even things which are not the property of Russian troops are sold or leased. What cannot be sold is unscrewed, detached, ripped off, or torn off and taken along.

The command of the group of forces is sensitive about such reports. As our correspondent Boris Lysenko writes, General Matvey Burlakov considers this an "attempt to cast slurs upon Russian servicemen and discredit them in the eyes of the German and world public" and shifts all responsibility to the "Russian emigre mafia."

Nonetheless, the colonel general honestly admits to some "shortcomings." For example, "in 1992, five attempts to steal weapons were made. We are aware of 50 instances in which German citizens attempted to purchase weapons from our servicemen, but they did not succeed." Matvey Burlakov did not try to conceal that "isolated, unrelated violations of the law occur: theft, speculation, the striving to profiteer on duty-free German goods." He even gave several examples.

Thus, Danilo, chief of the Stok trade enterprise in Dresden, facilitated tax evasion by a local company. The police apprehended him but soon let him go, failing to find corpus delicti in his actions. Major Vlasov, chief of a trading enterprise in an Air Force unit, tried to profiteer by selling rugs. Sokolov, a store director, sold cigarettes and alcoholic beverages at speculative prices. In the fall of 1992 four Russian soldiers were tried for stealing things from German cars, or stealing the cars. When caught at the crime scene they returned fire from an automatic weapon, wounding two law officers.

In 1992 financial damages were assessed against more than 100 officials, and some were even convicted; 27 employees of military trade were relieved from their positions and shipped out to Russia. However, Matvey Burlakov found references to "organized crime associated with mafia structures" to be "not legitimate."

He was genuinely bewildered as to the reasons for "criminal elements to be increasingly concentrating around our settlements and inhabited localities" who "engage in smuggling, stealing, and speculation," "penetrate the compounds of military settlements, commit violations of the law with regard to servicemen and members of their families, and try to draw our servicemen into their activities!"

Matvey Burlakov made short shrift of the complaints of the German side about the ecological condition of military settlements: "To be sure, there are problems. However, their scope is shown by the following example: The German side has complained on ecological grounds about nine settlements out of 468. Besides, most of the complaints were not confirmed, or were not related to us! We record the condition of the settlements we hand over on videotape."

However, the German authorities are not anxious about military settlements but rather about the extensive dumps, shooting ranges stuffed with ammunition, and gas pumps which were operated in violation of the norms established in Germany. The possibility of leaks from storage facilities for chemical weapons is not ruled out. In the opinion of the minister of Saxony for environmental protection affairs, Arnold Faatz, the Western

Group of Forces has inflicted greater damage on nature than was originally believed. In the words of the minister, "reclamation expenditures in Saxony alone will come to about 370 million marks."

Three Thousand TV Sets

Under the terms of the treaty signed in 1990 by Bonn and Moscow, Soviet troops undertook to hand over to German authorities the vacated real estate: houses in the cities and apartments in which the generals and families of officers lived. Despite a good one-half of the troops having been withdrawn, the officer apartments are not being vacated for some reason. The state housing construction company Lichtenberg, in the Berlin area of Karlshorst, expected 765 apartments of former Soviet officers to be transferred to it, but saw only 16 apartments transferred.

German officials established that new German, Russian, and Polish tenants with dubious documents live in such apartments. Some Soviet officers and their close and remote relatives have begun to rent dwellings. Companies selling jackets and second-hand audio equipment have established themselves in such houses. On Humboldtstrasse in Leipzig, German officials discovered a cheap Russian bordello. Quoting police sources, BERLINER MORGENPOST reported that the "illegal business" of Russian servicemen has inflicted on Germany losses amounting to about 100 million marks.

No matter how tempted the German authorities are to be patient and not stir things up, they nonetheless began to complain to Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, but it appears that there were no specific results. However, rumors about the commercialization of Russian troops in Germany reached the Russian president, who instructed the then chief state inspector, Yuriy Boldyrev, to figure out the situation.

In the beginning of 1993 the German DER SPIEGEL, rather than the Russian press, released to the public a 10-page report by Yuriy Boldyrev's experts. The report bears eloquent witness to the fact that we underestimate our servicemen, their intrinsic keen wit hardened under conditions of market relations approximating those on the battlefield as much as possible. The scope of the entrepreneurial activities of Russian military men turned out to be considerably broader than one could surmise.

Yuriy Boldyrev recommended that the Russian president immediately demote five highly placed generals in the Russian Ministry of Defense and begin an official investigation of the activities of the commander in chief of the Group of Forces, Matvey Burlakov, and two of his generals.

Yuriy Boldyrev's experts determined that Colonel General Matvey Burlakov instructed the Russian-Swiss joint venture Mos Eniko-Invest and a certain trading company from Riga to act as middlemen in the sale of fuel

and lubricants. The army sold 82,000 tonnes of diesel fuel to these companies at a dumping price of 27 pfennigs per liter.

DER SPIEGEL maintains that the profits from such trade (considerable profits) replenished the accounts of Latvian companies.

Trace of the 99 million marks which the Russian Army should have generated by selling ferrous metals has also been lost. To be sure, the auditors did establish that 17 million marks had been transferred to the accounts of certain companies in Finland, the United States, and Switzerland at the request of two generals from Moscow. Another 13 million deposited in an army account at the Leipzig branch of the Deutsche Bank disappeared in an unknown direction.

The command of the group of forces rejects charges of the massive acquisition of commercial batches of consumer goods by servicemen and attempts to avoid payment of customs duties. However, at a military warehouse state auditors found merchandise worth a total of 31 million marks which belonged to the valiant defenders of the motherland: 3,390 obsolete TV sets and video cassette recorders and thousands of dinner sets.

Burlakov's deputy for logistics and the commander of the 16th Air Army engaged in the delivery of goods in disregard of customs rules. Two installations for the production of vegetable oil were shipped to an unknown recipient in Stavropol; they were shipped "just like that," that is, free of charge. Some 17,000 liters of alcohol were shipped through Poland as army gear camouflaged to look like telephones.

On 4 March 1993 Yuriy Boldyrev was relieved from his position. Reorganization of the administrative services of the president was the technical explanation for his dismissal. At a press conference in Moscow which followed, Yuriy Boldyrev referred to the "indescribable" scope of corruption in the country. He gave only one statistic concerning theft in the Western Group of Forces. The extra foreign-exchange pay which Russian servicemen receive from the German Government and which is intended to facilitate the withdrawal of the troops is deposited by our warriors in accounts at German banks. Over 27 million marks have already been "taken care of" in this manner.

There Is Money But No Housing

However, as Boris Lysenko reports from Berlin, the leadership of the Group of Forces is more concerned about difficulties with the resettlement of the withdrawn troops than it is about the charges of corruption.

The main groupings of forces in the USSR used to be deployed along the Western border. Their infrastructure has now been taken over by Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, and Moldova. The issue of establishing new facilities for the withdrawn troops on the territory of Russia has arisen. Some 8,539 apartments have already

been built with German funds; only one-quarter of them are in Russia. Meanwhile, more than 20,000 families without apartments have been withdrawn to the territory of the Russian Federation.

In late January 1993 the German side raised the issue of speeding up the pace of resettlement of troops in Russia at a meeting of a mixed commission: So far, it has lagged behind the pace of withdrawal. The German side has appreciated the problem.

However, will the problem be solved? So far contracts have been signed for only 3 billion marks out of the total 8.35 billion marks appropriated by Bonn for the construction of housing; only 1.4 billion marks have been paid based on the results of work. Is this not strange? Germany is paying a pretty penny, but the issue of housing for servicemen is not being resolved in Russia.

Yet again our servicemen decided to display keen commercial wit and distributed construction contracts among less expensive, Turkish companies, rather than German companies, as the FRG Government had expected.

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Comments on Pullout

*PM2004101993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 16 Apr 93 p 7*

[Interview with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General V. Toporov by Aleksandr Furs: "DM550 Million on Extra Housing for Servicemen"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Defense Ministry commission studying the problem of the withdrawal of Russian forces from Germany has ended its work in the Western Group of Forces. Our correspondent Aleksandr Furs talked with Colonel General Vladimir Toporov, Russian Federation deputy defense minister, who headed the commission.

Furs: Vladimir Mikhaylovich, you have visited the formations and units that are being withdrawn and you have acquainted yourself with the organization of the withdrawal and the associated problems. What is your opinion?

Toporov: I must say that the group's personnel are doing a great deal of work to prepare the forces for withdrawal, which is not going unnoticed by the German side and it rates the work highly. At the same time, certain problems are arising over the removal of materiel, equipment, and movable property that are needed in Russia.

Some 120,000 items of equipment and armaments and 2.5 million tonnes of material supplies have been swiftly removed so far. One ferry and 100 freight cars loaded with equipment and property leave Germany for Russia daily. Everything possible is being done in the forces to cut the planned withdrawal period by four months.

There is the confidence that the units and formations are not merely leaving FRG territory, but are preparing in earnest to carry out tasks suited to their role on the territory of Russia in the future. One priority task, to which great significance is attached, is preparation for settling in at the new location as quickly as possible.

In turn, the Defense Ministry adopted a number of decisions on improving the situation and providing assistance for the forces that are being withdrawn. We signed a protocol on the use of the further allocation of 550 million Deutsche Marks [DM]. That is in addition to the program which envisages allocating DM7.8 billion for the construction of housing for forces being withdrawn from Germany. Some of the money will be used to acquire industrial equipment which will guarantee the implementation of the program for the construction of housing developments.

Furs: The internal districts have many problems of their own, associated with the provision of apartments and accommodation of forces. Then there are the forces that are being withdrawn from Germany...

Toporov: There are plenty of problems in this sphere, as you rightly say. We are leasing (this we are coordinating with the local authorities in the regions to which the forces are being withdrawn) recreation centers, the premises of former pioneer camps, boarding houses, and hostels... These problems are not new, they are familiar to all Soviet servicemen, in fact, many of them have been living in private apartments, renting a place from the owners.

Officers are not going to end up on the street: The government is allocating the funds to tackle these problems.

Furs: Vladimir Mikhaylovich, since the deadline for the withdrawal of forces has been brought forward, time is no longer on our side. What problems do you envisage in the matter of selling the movable property of the Western Group of Forces and will fundamental adjustments be required?

Toporov: One thing must be done, I believe: All adventurous proposals from certain local businessmen, from natives of the former USSR, and, indeed, from representatives of Russia must be rejected. These proposals look attractive; they look like an opportunity to sell property on very advantageous terms. We must remember in any case that we are obliged to fulfill our commitments under the 1990 treaty. That is number one. The second thing we must take on board is the fact that not all the property is for sale, since Russia is short of it. Sometimes the apparent cheapness, due to the absence of haulage costs for transportation to Russia, prompts the notion that it is more advantageous to sell it on the spot. But when we start to work out how much it would cost to obtain it in Russia at the new prices, we come to the conclusion that the property must be taken out. Prices are rising in our country and in some industrial sectors production links between enterprises and, indeed, between republics have

been destroyed, which greatly hinders the production of equipment and property the forces need and prolongs the production process...

By and large, officials in the Western Group of Forces are familiar with these problems and calculations and estimates have been made. We know this for a fact, but there are details which require the elaboration of further new documents with the participation of the Russian Government and Defense Ministry.

Furs: Some media in Germany, and, indeed, here in Russia, are still using as a sensational trump card the thesis that the Western Group of Forces leadership and commissioned and warrant officers are just selling off military property and weapons all the time. Are there grounds for publishing material like this?

Toporov: It would be wrong to say categorically that there have been no mistakes. But really the issue has been overplayed, deliberately exaggerated in view of the fight that is going on for Western Group of Forces property, with German firms among the culprits. People here know perfectly well that we will definitely leave at the agreed time. And unless we sort out and sell this property, it will basically be left here and offloaded cheap.

Various bodies and commissions, including our commission, have examined each instance, and no one has any fears that involvement in commercial deals is rife among leading personnel and officers.

Furs: On the territory of the FRG, where the Western Group of Forces is stationed, there are things of spiritual as well as material value. What is the Russian Defense Ministry's stance with regard to the debate over the symbols of our Fatherland's military glory, the memorial complexes in Treptow Park and the Tiergarten? The general opinion in the German press is that these monuments belong to occupying forces and should be dismantled after their departure...

Toporov: It must be said that this is not the position of the majority of the German population. The country's leadership appreciates that the monuments must remain and be properly maintained. They commemorate not only the Soviet soldiers who perished, but all those who perished in the Great Patriotic War and World War II.

Any other view is simply unacceptable in the conditions of the new relations and reconciliation between our peoples and the development of a partnership between Russia and Germany.

Kyrgyz President Calls For Russian Troop Withdrawal

*OW2304095893 Tokyo KYODO in English 0931 GMT
23 Apr 93*

[Text] Tokyo, April 23 KYODO—Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev on Friday [23 April] expressed hopes that

Russia will pull its troops out of Kyrgyzstan now that his republic has concluded a bilateral security pact with Moscow.

Akayev, who is on a 5-day visit to Japan, told a news conference at the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo that he hopes the pullout will take place within 2 or 3 years. He told reporters Kyrgyzstan has reversed its 1991 decision to create its own military of 5,000 to 7,000 troops.

Akayev, the first president elected by a direct national vote in the republic, said through an interpreter that Kyrgyzstan will be the only country among the 10 republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) without its own military.

A former optical physicist, Akayev said his republic will seek to defend its security on the basis of a relationship of trust called for by its bilateral security treaty with the Russian federation. "It was necessary to conclude a security treaty with Russia to defend our republic's security in its external and internal relations," Akayev said. "Our country decided to devote all of its energy to economic and intellectual development of the nation." He said his country is still reeling from the adverse fallout of the centrally-planned economy imposed under the rule of the former Soviet Union.

Akayev warned that the CIS faces a crisis in light of its member republics' economic malaise and security arrangements. He said, however, Kyrgyzstan cannot dismiss the importance of the presence of the CIS to ensure its members' security and economic reforms. "First, we need the CIS for the sake of collective security, and second we need it to expedite economic cooperation among its members and to conquer our economic crisis," he said.

"Kyrgyz people have lived under the rule of a Czarist Russia and then of the Soviet Union over the past 200 years. Kyrgyz citizens feel pain from the (recent) break-up...with the people of other regions (of the vast country) developed over time." [sentence as received]

Akayev is renowned for repeatedly calling on Russia to resolve the territorial fray with Japan over four islands off Japan's northern shores which were seized by the Soviet troops at the end of World War II. Akayev used to demand a solution of the territorial row repeatedly from the rostrum of the Congress of People's Deputies before he was swept to power following the 1991 abortive coup that overthrew former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev for 3 days.

However, he told reporters, as an elected leader of a commonwealth country, he would risk drawing criticism from Russia for meddling into its internal policies if he were to speak his mind on the situation now. He said he hopes Japan and Russia will be able to resolve the row without hurting each other's national prestige.

Belarus Hosts 'Costly' NATO Inspection

*WS2104121693 Minsk BELINFORM in Russian
1601 GMT 20 Apr 93*

[Text] Of the more than 30 inspection teams from practically all NATO countries and other European states, there has been none like the one that arrived in Belarus on 20 April. The Belarusian military are now referring to these inspections as "regular visits," meaning that they have been occurring more and more frequently. These inspections, the result of military treaties signed by Gorbachev and ratified by Belarusian lawmakers, are overtly aimed at keeping NATO's finger on the pulse of the young national Armed Forces.

The delegation that arrived on 20 April on the basis of the Vienna agreement—which stipulates that any signatory can inspect any selected territory three times a year—is composed of four experts and headed by British Colonel Anthony Davidson.

The Belarusian military is facing a tough task because the British experts have expressed their desire to inspect an area within the perimeter of Molodechno, Uzda, Slutsk, Beshenkovichi, Ushachi, and Bobruysk. This region is larger than many European countries. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense will have to provide transportation and liaison for the inspecting side, including liaison planes to communicate with all areas within the inspection site. All this is being done at the expense of Belarusian taxpayers.

A BELINFORM correspondent has been told by General Viktor Vakar, chief of the National Agency for Control and Inspections, that the British have not announced the reason for such a large-scale inspection. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will have to make inquiries about it. Otherwise, other costly visits may follow, because the Vienna agreement envisions the compulsory nature of such inspections, regardless of the motives put forward by the inspecting side.

In Gen Vakar's firm belief, the British inspection will not turn up any violations of the treaties signed by Belarus, including the Vienna agreement, because the Belarusian Army has not held any large-scale maneuvers that would require preliminary notification and regulation.

Estonia Readies To Take Over Local Russian Military Facilities

Planning for Airport Transfer

*WS2004093193 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE
in English 1837 GMT 19 Apr 93*

[Text] Tallinn, April 19—An Estonian commission on taking over a Russian military airport at Tapa will start operating on Tuesday, the head of the air defence department of Estonia's Defence Forces, Vello Loemaa, told ETA.

The commission and Russian military authorities will elaborate the timetable of returning the second largest ex-Soviet military airport in Estonia, he said.

New Civilian 'Owners' of Russian Bases Named

WS2204095193 Tallinn BNS in English 1454 GMT 21 Apr 93

[Text] Tallinn, Apr 21, BNS—Former Russian military bases in Estonia's Harju district have been turned over to local administrations for civilian use, the Estonian government said Tuesday.

The only exception is the Aegviidu tank base, one of the largest bases in the former Baltic military district. Part of it will be used by Estonian defense forces; the rest will be run by the local forestry department.

Although Russian forces still occupy most of the bases, each of them already has an owner.

"This is done so that the owner watches over the safety of the property and prevents looting as troops leave the premises," said Prime Minister Mart Laar, referring to problems that have occurred elsewhere.

Latvia Contemplates Legislation Related to Russian Troop Withdrawal

Government Communique Supports Legislation, Criticizes Yeltsin

*WS2704123793 Riga LETA in English 1055 GMT
27 Apr 93*

[Text] Riga, April 27 (LETA)—On April 23, 1993, the Russian Federation President's press center distributed Boris Yeltsin's communique regarding the draft legislation about the issuance of temporary residential permits to persons whose stay in the Republic of Latvia is connected with the temporary dislocation of the Russian Federation military forces in the Republic of Latvia, which draft legislation is being discussed in the Republic of Latvia Supreme Council.

In this regard the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to issue the following communique.

It is surprising that a top state official, respectively, the Russian Federation President, expresses his opinion and makes hasty conclusions about a matter which is being discussed as draft legislation in another country's parliament thereby attempting to influence the course and adoption of such legislation. This is a rare occurrence in international relations and it is difficult to qualify it otherwise but as an interference in a state's internal affairs, especially since the specific draft legislation discusses an item which is irrefutable: the withdrawal of Russia's military forces.

Until now, Russia has not questioned the necessity for the withdrawal of the military forces and has even undertaken obligations within the framework of the

CSCE and the UN organizations to withdraw these forces even sooner. However, during the negotiations with Russia, which have been ongoing for more than one year, it had not been possible to reach an agreement about the military personnel and their family members who would need to leave Latvia within the parameters of the army withdrawal. Eventually, such a delay leads to the fact that Russia could demobilize its entire army here which is absolutely unacceptable to Latvia and is in contradiction to Russia's own international obligations to withdraw these military troops. The current discussions in the Republic of Latvia Supreme Council concern such problems which require an immediate solution.

Just as unacceptable are the demands expressed in the Russian President's communique that citizenship be granted to the above-mentioned group of people. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly emphasized that there is no legal basis for the presence of Russia's military troops here and there is even a greater lack of grounds for the military officers and their family members to claim Latvian citizenship. The communique's statements about the domestic situation in Latvia and especially about the situation regarding human rights is categorically unacceptable to us. These statements do not only contradict the conclusions of various international experts regarding this issue but the tone of these statements is not acceptable in international relations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must make a presumption and simultaneously express regret that Russia's President is being misinformed about the true situation in Latvia, as witnessed by his expressions at the summit meeting with us President Clinton, as well as this most recent communique about draft legislation being discussed by the Latvian Supreme Council. Latvia has always been ready to resolve these questions through negotiations. What is urgently needed is only such willingness from Russia's side. Riga April 26, 1993

Russian Negotiator Threatens to Suspend Talks

*WS2704083493 Tallinn BNS in English 1113 GMT
26 Apr 93*

[Text] Moscow, Apr 26, BNS—The Russian negotiator with Latvia threatened to cancel the next round of bilateral talks if Latvia insists on passing a bill on temporary living permits for Russia's servicemen.

The bill, scheduled to be approved by the Latvian Supreme Council April 28, would provide a legal basis for the deportation of tens of thousands of ethnic Russians, charged Sergey Zotov, Russia's ambassador at large.

In a statement released Saturday [24 Apr], Zotov says Russia sees no point in holding the next round of the talks, scheduled for April 26-28, because the Latvian parliament would doom it to failure.

The bill would nullify much of the progress already made at the talks, he said, and ruin whatever has been done by

the two delegations to provide social security guarantees for Russian servicemen leaving Latvia.

Zotov called the bill an "anti-Russian move." It comes at a time when Russia is taking enormous efforts to pull out from Latvia its armed forces, he said. In one year, Russia has managed to reduce its strength from 57,000 to 22,000 men.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Presidential Statement on Destruction of Chemical Weapons

Yeltsin Outlines National Elimination Program

*LD2004194693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1845
GMT 20 Apr 93*

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—The Russian president's press service has circulated a statement of Russian President Boris Yeltsin on elimination of chemical arms:

Public of several regions has been recently alarmed over the destruction of chemical arms.

Tens of thousands of tonnes of combat toxic agents were produced and stored in Russia over several decades. The world has changed, same as Russia's position in the world, we do not plan to attack anyone.

It is time to get rid of chemical arms - the past we have inherited. This is not only the opinion of Russia, it is also the common opinion of 138 states, which signed a convention to ban chemical arms this year in Paris.

We must start the elimination of chemical arms, proceeding from requirements of international and national safety; shells and tanks gradually become worthless and they cannot be stored forever. The arms were produced by several plants for many years.

The destruction will be complicated and it will take much time. But it must be started. A state program on elimination of chemical arms is being prepared. The program will be based on the following principles:

1. Unconditional provision of safety of the population's life and health and the environment;
2. Unconditional fulfillment of all requirements on social protection of the population, residing in the zone of influence of enterprises to destruct chemical arms;
3. The use of advanced technologies to minimize the risk and receive in the destruction, when it is possible, precious chemical substances;
4. Minimum toxic agents' transportation on Russian territory.

The destruction of chemical arms will start only after a positive conclusion of the state ecological examination on the whole program and each specific facility. The

examination will involve scientists, specialists, representatives or public, including ecological, organizations, both regional and all-Russian.

I call on the executive power bodies of Udmurtiya, Chuvashiya and the Saratov region to actively join the elaboration of the program, establish the priorities and conditions of preparations for the destruction of chemical arms. This participation will help to turn this step, inevitable for Russia, into a powerful lever of social-economic development of many Russian regions and strict observation of guarantees of the population's safety.

A considerable part of money to be allocated on the program will be used for regional health care, mother and child care, housing construction, building of cultural facilities, highways and other engineering infrastructure.

Piles of useless and dangerous chemical arms is a heavy burden of the past. Russia must get rid of it in the interests of its own safety, in the interests of safety of the whole world.

Commentary Supports Destruction

*MK2404131693 Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian
No. 46, 24 Apr 93 p 3 (Signed to Press 23 Apr)*

[Russian Presidential Statement on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons under the rubric "Document"]

[Text] In recent months, the public in a number of regions has been alarmed over the problem of the destruction of chemical weapons.

Tens of thousands of tonnes of toxic combat agents have been produced and stored in Russia over the preceding decades. The world has changed, as has Russia's position in the world—we are not going to attack anyone. The time has come to get rid of chemical weapons—a past we have inherited. This is not the opinion of Russia alone, but also the shared opinion of 138 countries that signed a convention banning chemical weapons in Paris this year.

We must start destruction of chemical weapons proceeding not only from the requirements of international but also national security: because the condition of the shells and containers is gradually degrading and the weapons cannot be stored indefinitely. These weapons were manufactured over many years at several factories. The destruction process will be complex, and will take much time to complete. But a start should be made. A state program for the destruction of chemical weapons is being prepared at the present time. It will be based on the following principles:

1. Complete safety as regards human life and the environment;

2. Full compliance with all the requirements for the social welfare of the population living in the zones influenced by the presence of the chemical weapons destruction enterprises;

3. The use of the latest technologies which ensure minimal risk and permit as a result of destruction, where possible, the production of expensive chemical substances;

4. Reduction to a minimum of the transport of toxic substances across the territory of Russia. Work to destroy chemical weapons shall be started only upon positive findings by state expert examination on the program as a whole and on each installation. Taking an active part in such expert examination will necessarily be not only scientists and specialists, but also representatives of public, including ecological, organizations, both all-Russian and regional.

I am calling upon the bodies of executive power of Udmurtia, Chuvashia, and Saratov Oblast to join actively in the drafting of this program, setting the priorities, and determining the conditions for the preparation for work to destroy chemical weapons. This participation will help turn this inevitable step into a powerful lever of social and economic development of considerable territories of the country under strictly ensured guarantees of population safety.

A sizable part of the funds obligated for the above-mentioned program will be channeled to solve problems related to regional health issues, the welfare of mothers and children, the building of housing, community projects, roads, and other civil engineering infrastructure projects.

The mountains of now useless and dangerous weapons are a burdensome heritage of our past. Russia should get rid of them for the benefit of its own security and for the security of the entire world.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin 20 April 1993

Further Report

*LD2004134693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1240 GMT 20 Apr 93*

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today called on the executive authorities of Udmurtia, Chuvashia and Saratov region to actively join the efforts to draw up a state programme to scrap chemical weapons.

The president's statement on the problem of destroying chemical weapons, released by his press service, notes that such a programme was now being drawn up and would unquestionably guarantee the safety of human lives and the population's health, as well as of the environment. It will also be based on the fulfilment of all the requirements linked with the social protection of the population within the zones affected by enterprises destroying chemical weapons, on the use of the latest

technologies, reducing to the minimum the risks involved and allowing to obtain costly chemical substances, on the minimum transportation of toxic substances.

Controversy Over Chemical Weapons Reporting

93WC0057A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 7

[Article by St. Kucher: "What Russian Secret Did the American Journalist Learn?"]

[Text] Last September MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI published an article by Russian scientists Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, associates of the Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, entitled "Poisoned Policy," in which they described the continuing research in the field of chemical weapons in Russia. Several days after publication of the article, the Ministry of Security of Russia accused Mirzayanov of having divulged a state secret and set up a commission of inquiry. At approximately this same time Mirzayanov gave a detailed interview to William England, Moscow correspondent of the American BALTIMORE SUN newspaper. Subsequently England conducted his own investigation into chemical weapons research in Russia, the result of which were his articles in the BALTIMORE SUN. The last one appeared at the end of March.

Last week England was summoned to testify in the Mirzayanov case to the Ministry of Security of Russia's Lefortovo Center, where he was asked to disclose the sources of the information of which he had availed himself. The fact of the scandal surrounding the scientists, the journalist, and the information divulged by them is to hand, but little is known of its specific content. With the BALTIMORE SUN's permission we offer readers an abridged version of the material published by England.

Despite the fact that Russia has subscribed to the Convention Banning the Manufacture of Chemical Weapons presented to the United Nations by 30 states in September 1992, Russian scientists under the leadership of the military are continuing active development of the latest strong nerve gases within the framework of a secret program codenamed Foliant. Scientists from a special laboratory of the Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology—the main institute engaged in such research—maintain that, contrary to the statements of Soviet and Russian leaders, they have not terminated a search for the most efficient lethal gases. In addition, they have as of this time succeeded in bringing into the world gases superior in terms of their characteristics to any American counterparts.

Research within the framework of the secret program began in the institute in 1982. Exactly 5 years later, when Gorbachev was for the first time being subjected to public criticism for the use of chemical weapons, Soviet scientists devised a new nerve gas with the significant name of Novichok-5. In September last year even they

were working on Novichok-8 and 9. These gases are highly toxic substances, which, penetrating the skin and the lungs, induce paralysis of the nervous system.

The efficiency of the nerve gases was confirmed not only by experiments on animals and, apparently, people but also by an incident which occurred with a physicist during work on Novichok-5. An extractor fan in his laboratory once malfunctioned, and the gas entered the scientist's lungs. Shaking, he got out of the room and collapsed in the corridor in a torment of laryngeal convulsions and hallucinations. In the Sklifosovskiy Institute, where he was taken immediately by KGB officers, Dr. Yevgeniy Vedernikov succeeded in saving the victim from inevitable death (the contagion had induced almost total paralysis of the nervous system), but he was unable to spare him tragic consequences: For six months the scientist was unable to walk or read, and partial paralysis of the arms persists to this day....

The components of the gas are produced by a chemical industry enterprise in Volgograd. The gas was originally tested on the Volga near Saratov, and the last tests of its efficiency were conducted in January in Uzbekistan, south of the Aral Sea. According to Mirzayanov, the leaders of this republic, which had by that time already become an independent state, most likely knew nothing of these tests.

Eduard Sarkisyan, the sole associate of the laboratory who agreed to have his name mentioned in this material, says that the laboratory had for many years been a "kind of microworld of discipline, purpose, and privilege." The scientists earned very good money for those times and were content....

They worked with a sense of recognition of the "noble goals of the state's defense capability." The conditions of secrecy were such that the associates were required to show a pass even when going from one floor to another. The government allocated the research institute the most consummate equipment, hired the most promising young scientists, and regularly supplied them with goods in short supply.

In 1987 the Soviet government announced the end, for its part, of the production of war gas. Eduard Shevardnadze announced in 1989 in Paris that the USSR had conclusively terminated the production of gases and would "no longer endeavor to conceal the corresponding enterprises and warehouses from the public eye." Neither Gorbachev nor Shevardnadze nor any of their advisers made any statements about the ongoing research in this field.

Neither the Yeltsin government nor Mikhail Gorbachev himself see anything "improper" in research into new toxic substances. In a statement for the BALTIMORE SUN Aleksandr Likhotal, Gorbachev's press spokesman, drew a clear distinction between the regular production of chemical weapons and scientific work on research into new types of arms. Regular production, according to

him, did, indeed, end in 1987. But, he emphasized, the USSR never undertook to halt research in the sphere of new gases.

Mikhail Gorbachev's position is supported by Sergey Kiselev, chairman of the Committee for Disarmament in the Sphere of Chemical Weapons at the Russian Foreign Ministry, and General Anatoliy Kuntsevich, who under Gorbachev dealt with chemical weapons matters and who is now Yeltsin's adviser on chemical and bacteriological disarmament: "The Soviet Union did not make any commitments not to develop chemical weapons."

Both Kiselev and Kuntsevich made available information which they had within the framework of bilateral negotiations shared with the United States—it concerns only the types of chemical weapons which are already known. At no negotiations with the United States was there mention of the Novichoks.

American experts believe that the United States is not now engaged in a search for new strong gases inasmuch, as one reliable source said, as "the States is confident that it will hardly need gas more toxic than that which it already has." Gordon Burke, American consultant on the Chemical Arms Convention, observed that to determine the "degree of ethicality" of the research in Moscow "we need to understand where the line between defense and offense runs." "Defensive research will always continue," he said. "But if the work on a new gas has been conducted under a veil of secrecy, Boris Yeltsin will feel uncomfortable in the face of the world community."

Dr. Sarkisyan believes that research in the field of toxic substances can and should continue: "Russia is ultimately a superpower, it has giant potential in this respect, and it has the right to conduct such research. Whether it should be conducted openly and whether its results should be published in the press is another matter."

According to Dr. Mirzayanov, the stockpiles of chemical weapons on the territory of the former USSR now constitute approximately 60,000 tonnes, which is 10 tonnes [as published] more than the ceiling specified by the agreement with the United States.

Our Commentary

The scandal which has erupted in connection with the articles which have appeared in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and the BALTIMORE SUN amounts to two

questions: whether Russian scientists divulged information which is a state secret and whether Russia is acting amorally before the international community by continuing the research into new types of chemical weapons.

Mirzayanov maintains that he divulged no state secret in his interview and publication. The Ministry of Security, which detained him for 11 days in prison at the Lubyanka, thinks otherwise. Nonetheless, neither Mirzayanov nor his lawyer were permitted to familiarize themselves with the secret provision of the law in accordance with which he was charged. In addition, all the candidates for membership of the commission looking into the Mirzayanov case suggested by his lawyer were rejected by the indictment. So the question of the secrecy of the published information remains open pending trial.

The problem of "morality" in Russia's actions may, as can be seen from England's material, be seen variously. Whereas the USSR was, indeed, engaged in the production of war gas contrary to the public statements of its leaders, whether Russia is today producing such substances is unclear. That it is conducting research is a fact, but no one has banned research. The Geneva convention on the banning of the development of chemical weapons and their destruction at the start of the next century has yet to acquire the force of international law. It is hard, furthermore, to define the invisible line between "research" and "production." Where does the first end and the second begin? Even General Kuntsevich, who is mentioned in the material, said that he "does not know of a mechanism of control of the production of such weapons...."

One further question concerns the ethical nature of the actions of the scientists themselves, who for many years were "well fed" thanks to their "sinister" work and who are now revealing the ins and outs of it to foreign correspondents. Have they really suddenly "seen the light," discerning in their discoveries a source of lethal danger for the world! And even if there has been a sudden awakening and if our country truly is in violation of its own commitments, it is, as before, our country.... A rhetorical question to which there is no simple answer.

One thing is clear: In having arrested Mirzayanov and in now summoning for questioning England (who, incidentally, was denied the right to testify in the presence of a lawyer), the security authorities of the Russian Federation have afforded the radical intelligentsia here and in the West a pretext for altogether beginning once again to talk about state security's offensive against free speech in Russia and the persecution of scientists. In a word, we have a scandal. A scandal which could have been avoided had state security employed subtler moves in its undoubtedly necessary work.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

EC Asked by Baltics To Help Speed Russian Troop Withdrawal*BR2004151593 Brussels BELGA in French 1921 GMT
19 Apr 93*

[Article signed ARS: "First Meeting Between Baltic States and EC Troika"; as released by Brussels BELGA Database]

[Text] Copenhagen, 19 Apr (BELGA)—On Monday in Copenhagen, during their first meeting with the so-called troika of the European Community, the three Baltic states focused attention on the problems with their important Russian-speaking minority.

The political leaders of the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are worried particularly about the slow withdrawal of Russian troops—in all, there are still some 45,000 Russian soldiers stationed in the three Baltic states.

"Any pressure by the European Community to speed up the withdrawal is welcome", Estonian Foreign Affairs Minister Trivimi Velliste stated at a joint news conference. In this connection, his Danish colleague, Niels Helveg Petersen, emphasized that the EC continues to exert pressure on Moscow for a "fast, orderly, and full withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic states."

Traditionally, the EC troika consists of the Community's present president (Denmark), its previous president (Great Britain), and its future president (Belgium).

Foreign Affairs Minister Willy Claes, who attended the meeting on behalf of our country, emphasized after the meeting that "the persistent presence of Russian troops contravenes all rules of international law." Furthermore, Claes criticized the fact that Russian President Boris Yeltsin had suspended the withdrawal from Estonia and Latvia, and had linked it to the respect of the (Russian) minority's rights. (According to Yeltsin, the latter are respected in Lithuania, and the withdrawal of Russian troops there will be completed by next August.)

According to Petersen, Moscow's allegation that the Russian minority's human rights are being violated in Estonia and Latvia "has yet to be proved," and he applauded the Baltic republics' willingness to admit international commissions of inquiry to investigate the allegations.

However, Minister Claes believes that, "in spite of the Baltic states' delicate position with regard to Russia, the Community should pay attention to the rights of the minorities in these countries." In this connection, he suggested that the Baltic states could appeal to the expertise of international institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

and the Council of Europe, to settle the problems with their minorities with regard to the use of languages and naturalization.

Claes added that the full withdrawal of Russian troops would contribute to a better dialogue between the Baltic states and the ("former occupier") Russia.

For the Baltic states, the relatively important presence of Russian troops is a touchy subject. Lithuania's Foreign Affairs Minister Georgs Andrejevs stated that, in the capital of Riga, near the Parliament Building, an large Russian unit is still stationed, "and this constitutes a real threat."

According to the authorities' estimates, there currently are some 8,000 Russian soldiers left in Estonia, much less than the 30,000 before the Soviet Union's collapse. In Lithuania, their number already has been halved to 24,000, whereas in Latvia their number has dropped from 45,000 to 12,000. In this connection, Minister Claes regretted that, so far, the financial promises made by EC countries for financing the housing of those soldiers that have been withdrawn have been kept only by Denmark.

Besides their relations with Russia, the economic cooperation and development of the Baltic republics also were on the meeting's agenda. According to Minister Claes, who was the troika's spokesman on this issue, the Baltic states "should first look at one another," and step up their mutual cooperation. "So far, the Baltic states have concluded too many bilateral agreements, and should learn from our Benelux model." According to Claes, the difficulties in regional cooperation between the Baltic states is due mainly to their different monetary situations.

Estonia still had important assets with the international monetary institutions, which had been frozen after its annexation by Russia. After its independence, Estonia benefited from the unblocked assets to rapidly create its own currency, which is linked to the German mark, and to conduct a strict monetary policy. In the two other Baltic republics, this was not the case, which is why their monetary and commercial integration remains hard to achieve.

In Copenhagen, the Baltic states insisted once again that a free-trade area be set up with the Community. But, according to Claes, a free-trade area would, in the short term, have very harmful consequences for the precarious economic reforms which have been carried out in these countries. "At present, their young companies are no match for our companies. The already implemented privatizations would be undone by a free-trade area with the EC," Claes said. He also pleaded for a gradual liberalization.


Finally, the minister argued that, no matter how delicate the current relations between the Baltic states and Russia, they eventually also must focus on the markets in the former Soviet Union. "If economic reforms in Russia actually are implemented—and after the referendum on 25 April—this certainly is possible, the Baltic states should not neglect this potential market."

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